I.—Scope of the treatise

II.—Definition of war, and origin of the word

[I]II.—Law is considered as a rule of action, and divided into rectorial law and equatorial law

IV.—A body of rights in respect to quality is divided into facilities and aptitudes

V.—Faculties, or legal rights strictly so called, are divided into powers, propertiy rights, and contractual rights

VI.—Another divison of legal rights, into private and public

VII.—What is aptitude?

VIII.—On expletive justice and attributive justice; that these are not properly distinguished by geometrical and arithmetical proportion, and that the latter is not concerned with public property, the former with private property

IX.—Law is definned as a rule, and divided into the law of nature and volitional law

X.—Definition of the law of nature, division, and distinction from things which are not properly, so called

XI.—That the instict common to other animals, or that peculiar to man, does not constitute another kind of law

XII.—In what way the existence of the law of nature is proved

XIII.—Division of volitional law into human and divine

XIV.—Human law is divided into municipal law, law narrower in scope than municipal law, and law broader in scope than municipal law, which is the law of nations; explanation thereof, and how proved

XV.—Divine law is divided into universal divine law and divine law peculiar to a single people

XVI.—That those not of Jewish birth have never been bound by the Hebraic law

XVII.—What arguments Christians may draw from the Hebraic law, and in what way

I.—That war is not in conflict with the law of nature is proved by several considerations

II.—That war is not in conflict with the law of nature is proved from, history

III.—That war is not in conflict with the law of nature is proved from general agreement

IV.—Proof is adduced that war is not in conflict with the law of nations

V.—Proof is adduced that war was not in conflict with the divine volitional law before the time of the Gospel, and objections are answered

VI.—Preliminary considerations bearing upon the question whether war is in conflict with the law of the Gospel

VII.—Arguments drawn from Holy Writ on behalf of the negative view, that war is not in conflict with the law of the Gospel

VIII.—Answering of the arguments from Holy Writ on behalf of the affirmative view, that war is in conflict with the law of the Gospel

IX.—The agreement of the early Christians in regard to the subject under discussion is examined

II.—The proposition, that according to the law of nature not all private war is unpermissible since the establishment of courts, is defended, illustrations being added

III.—The proposition is defended that private war in some cases is permissible even according to the law of the Gospel, objections being met

IV.—Division of public war into formal and less formal

V.—Whether there may be a public war waged by the authority of a public official not having sovereign power, and when

VI.—In what the civil power consists

VII.—What is sovereignty is

VIII.—The opinion that sovereignty always resides in the people is rejected, and arguments are answered

IX.—The argument that there is always a relation of mutual dependence between king and people, is refuted

X.—Cautions are offered for the right understanding of the true opinion: the first is, in regard to the distinguishing of similar words which differ in meaning

XI.—The second caution, as to distinguishing rights from the manner of possessing rights

XII.—It is shown that in some cases the sovereign power is held absolutely, that is with right of transfer

XIII.—It is shown that in some cases the sovereign authority is not held absolutely

XIV.—It is shown that in some cases intermediate governmental authority is held absolutely, that is with right of transfer

XV.—The distinction stated is reinforced from the difference in mode of appointing regents in kingdoms

XVI.—It is shown that sovereignty is not limited even by a promise of that which lies outside the sphere of the law of nature or of divine law

XVII.—It is shown that sovereignty is sometimes divided into parts, subjective or potential

XVIII.—That nevertheless it is wrong to infer that there is a division of sovereignty when kings do not wish certain acts of theirs to have the force of law unless approved by some assembly

XIX.—That other examples of wrong inference regarding the division of sovereignty are found under this head

XX.—True examples of mixed sovereignty

XXI.—It is shown that sovereignty may be vested in him who is bound by an unequal alliance; and objections are met

XXII.—That sovereignty may be held by him who pays tribute

XXIII.—That sovereignty may be held by him who is bound by feudal law

XXIV.—Distinction between the right of sovereignty and the exercise of the right, with examples

I.—State of the question

II.—That as a general rule rebellion is not permitted, by the law of nature

III.—That rebellion is not allowable according to Hebraic law

IV.—That rebellion is even less allowable according to the law of the Gospel; proof is presented from Holy Writ

V.—That rebellion is not allowable according to the practice of the early Christians

VI.—The view which holds that it is permissible for subordinate officials to rebel against sovereign authority is refuted, both by argument and by Holy Writ

VII.—What view is to be taken in case of extreme and in other respects unavoidable necessity

VIII.—That the right to make war may be conceded against him who has the chief authority among a free people

IX.—That the right to make war may be conceded against a king who has abdicated the sovereign power

X.—That the right to make war may be conceded against a king who alienates his kingdom, but only so far as to prevent the transfer

XI.—That the right to make war may be conceded against a king who openly shows himself the enemy of the whole people

XII.—That the right to make war may he conceded against a king who has lost his kingdom in consequence of a commissory law

XIII.—That the right to make war may be conceded against a king who, possessing only a part of the sovereign power, seeks to possess himself of the part that does not belong to him

XIV.—That the right to make war is conceded against a king in case liberty to offer resistance has in certain cases been reserved

XV.—How far obedience should be rendered to a usurper of sovereign power

XVI.—That resistance by force may be used against a usurper by virtue of a right of war still continuing

XVII.—That resistance by force may be used against a usurper by virtue of a pre-existing law

XVIII.—That resistance by force may be used against a usurper by virtue of a mandate of one possessing sovereign power

XIX.—Why resistance to a usurper should be limited to the cases mentioned

XX.—When the right of sovereignty is in dispute private persons ought not to take it upon themselves to settle the matter

I.—The efficient causes of war are in part those who wage war on their own account as principals

II.—The efficient causes of war are in part those who wage war on another's account, as auxiliary agents

III.—The efficient causes of war are in part those who wage war as instruments, as servants and subjects

IV.—By the law of nature no one is enjoined from waging war