I. What causes of war may be called justifiable

II. Justifiable causes include defence, the obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, and the inflicting of punishment

III. War for the defence of life is permissible

IV. War in defence of life is permissible only against an actual assailant

V. War in defence of life is permissible only when the danger is immediate and certain, not when it is merely assumed

VI. Defence of limb against injury is also justifiable

VII. The defence of chastity is in the highest degree justifiable

VIII. Not to take advantage of the right of defence is permissible

IX. Defence is sometimes not permissible against a person useful to the state because at variance with the law of love

[105] X. It is not permissible for Christians to kill in order to ward off a blow, or to avoid any indignity of like sort, or to prevent any escape

XI. By the law of nature it is permissible to kill in defetice of property

XII. How far defence of property is permitted by the law of Moses

XIII. Whether, and under what limitations, it is permissible, according to the law of the Gospel, to kill in defence of property

XIV. Whether the civil law, in permitting that life be taken in self-defence, confers a right, or merely freedom from punishment, is discussed, with a noting of distinctions

XV. When a single combat may be permissible

XVI. Concerning defence in public war

XVII. A public war is not admitted to be defensive which has as its only purpose to weaken the power of a neighbour

XVIII. A public war is not admitted to be defensive on the part of him who has himself given just cause for war

I. The division of that which is our own

II. The origin and development of the right of private ownership

III. That certain things, such as the sea both as a whole and in its principal divisions, cannot become subject to private ownership, and why

IV. That unoccupied lands become the property of the individuals who become occupants of them, unless they have been taken over as a whole by a people

V. That wild animals, fish, and birds belong to the man who has caught them, unless a law forbids

VI. That in case of necessity men have the right to use things which have become the property of another, and whence this right comes

VII. That the right, in case of necessity, to use things belonging to others, holds when the necessity is in no way avoidable

VIII. That the right, in case of necessity, to use things belonging to another, holds except when the possessor has equal need

IX. That there is, further, an obligation to restore the things of another used in case of necessity, whenever restoration shall be possible

X. Application of this right in the case of wars

XI. That men possess the right to use things which have become the property of another, for a purpose which involves no detriment to the owner

XII. Hence the right to the use of running water

XIII. Hence, also, the right of passage over land and rivers, with explanation

XIV. Whether a tax may be imposed upon merchandise passing through a country

[120] XV. The right of temporary sojourn

XVI. Those who have been driven from their homes have the right to acquire a permanent residence in another country, in submission to the government there in authority

XVII. The right of possession over desert places in respect to foreigners, and how this must be understood

XVIII. The right to such acts as human life requires

XIX. The right to such acts as human life requires includes the right to buy the things that are necessary

XX. The right to such acts as human life requires does not oblige a man to sell what belongs to him

XXI. The right to such acts as human life requires includes the right to seek marriages in foreign countries ; explanation

XXII. The right to do those things which are permitted without distinction to foreigners

XXIII. Such a right must be understood as applying only to things permitted as it were by the law of nature, not granted as a favour

XXIV. Whether a contract is permissible with a people that it should sell its crops to those with whom it has made the contract, and not to others

I. That original acquisition is accomplished through division or through occupation

II. In this connexion other modes of acquisition, as the granting of an incorporeal right, are excluded from consideration

III. The forming of a new property from existing materials is also excluded from consideration

IV. Occupation is twofold, having relation to sovereignty and to ownership ; this distinction is explained

V. That the taking possession of movable things can be prevented by law

VI. On what right the ownership of property by infants and by insane persons rests

VII. That rivers can be acquired by occupation

VIII. That a part of the sea can likewise be acquired

IX. That formerly in the countries constituting the Roman Empire such ownership of a part of the sea was not conceded

X. That nevertheless the law of nature does not present any obstacle to such acquisition in respect to a part of the sea which is, as it were, shut in by lands

XI. In what way such possession may be taken, and, how long it will last

XII. That such possession does not give the right to impede innocent passage

XIII. That sovereignty can be acquired over a part of the sea, and in what way

XIV. That for certain reasons a tax can be laid upon those who sail upon the sea

XV. Of the agreements which forbid a people to sail beyond certain bounds

XVI. Whether or not a change in the course of a river involves a change of territory is set forth, with a distinction

XVII. What conclusion is to be reached if the bed of a river has been completely changed

XVIII. That sometimes an entire river belongs to a territory

XIX. That things which have been abandoned become the property of him who takes possession of them, unless a state has acquired a general right of ownership over them

[138] I. Why ownership by usucaption or by prescription properly so called does not occur between states or their rulers

II. That nevertheless possession of long standing is wont to be urged as a right even between states or rulers

III. The question is decided according to presumptions of human intent ; and these presumptions are not based on words alone

IV. But such presumptions are based also on acts

V. Such presumptions are based also on things not done

VI. How length of time together with non-possession and silence amounts to an abandonment of right

VII. Time exceeding the memory of man ordinarily suffices for such a presumption ; of what sort such time is

VIII. Answer to the objection, that no one ought to be assumed to abandon his right

IX. Without such presumption it seems that by universal customary law ownership is transferred by possession exceeding the memory of man

X. Whether unborn children can in like manner be deprived of a right

XI. Even the right of sovereignty is gained by a people or king by long-standing possession

XII. Whether the civil statutes concerning ownership by usucaption and by prescription bind the one who holds sovereign power ; explanation, with distinctions

XIII. Those rights of sovereignty which can be separated from it, or shared with others, are gained and lost by right of ownership based on usucaption or on prescription

XIV. Refutation of the opinion alleging that subjects are always allowed to assert their liberty

XV. Whatever belongs to faculty pure and simple is not lost by lapse of time ; explanation

I. Concerning the rights of parents over children

II. Distinction in respect to the period of infancy, and concerning the ownership of property by infants

III. Of the period of life in the family beyond infancy

IV. Concerning the right of restraining children

V. Concerning the right of selling children

VI. Of the period of life beyond infancy and outside of the family

VII. Distinction between the power of parents by the law of nature and that by the municipal law

VIII. Concerning the right of the husband over the wife

IX. Whether denial of divorce and restriction to one woman are necessary to marriage according to the law of nature or only according to the law of the Gospel

X. That according to the law of nature alone marriages are not void by reason of lack of consent of the parents

XI. That according to the law of the Gospel marriages with the husband or wife of another are void

XII. That according to the law of nature marriages of parents with children are unlawful and void

XIII. That marriages of brothers with sisters, mothers-in-law with sons-in-law, fathers-in-law with daughters-in-law, and other similar marriages are unlawful and void by volitional divine law

XIV. That the same objection does not seem to hold in case of marriages with relatives of a degree farther removed

XV. That certain marriages, which are classed by the laws as concubinage, can take place and are lawful

XVI. That certain marriages can be unlawfully contracted and nevertheless be valid

XVII. The right of the majority in associations of any kind

XVIII. Which opinion should prevail in case of a tie vote

XIX. What opinions should be divided and what joined

XX. That the right of those who are absent accrues to those present

XXI. What rank is to be observed among equals, even kings

XXII. In associations which are based upon property, the votes must be counted according to the shares which each has in the property

XXIII. The right of a state over its subjects

XXIV. Whether it is permissible for nationals to withdraw from a state ; explanation, with a distinction

XXV. The state has no legal claim against exiles

XXVI. The right, arising from consent, over an adopted child

XXVII. The right over slaves

XXVIII. To what extent the right of life and death may be said to exist in the right over slaves

XXIX. What according to the law of nature should be decided concerning those who are born of slaves?

XXX. Different kinds of slavery

XXXI. The right gained by consent over a people which submits

XXXII. The right over a person resulting from a crime

I. What is necessary, on the part of the giver, that the alienation of a right should be valid

II. What is necessary on the part of the receiver

III. That sovereignty can be alienated, sometimes by the king, sometimes by the people

IV. That sovereignty over a part of a people cannot be alienated by the people against the will of the part

V. That a part cannot alienate the sovereignty over itself except in case of extreme necessity

VI. The reason for the difference indicated

VII. That sovereignty over a place can be alienated

VIII. Refutation of the opinion that a king can lawfully alienate portions of his dominion for reasons of advantage or necessity

IX. That infeudation and pledging are contained in alienation

X. That for alienating inferior powers also the consent of the people is required, either express or inferred from custom

XI. That the public domain cannot be alienated by kings

XII. That it is necessary to distinguish the income arising out of public domains from the domains themselves

XIII. To what extent parts of the public domain can be pledged by kings, and why

XIV. That a will is a form of alienation and formed upon the law of nature

I. That certain laws of states are unjust and. therefore do not transfer ownership ; such as those which confiscate the goods of shipwrecked persons in favour of the state treasury

II. That according to the law of nature property is justly acquired by a man who has received another's property to satisfy a debt ; when this may take place

III. How intestate succession has its origin in nature

IV. Whether any of the property of parents is due to children according to the law of nature ; explanation, with a distinction

V. That in a succession children are preferred to the father and mother of the deceased, and why

VI. The origin of vicarious succession, which is called representation, or succession in the place of and with the rights of another

VII. On abdication and disinheritance

VIII. Concerning the rights of illegitimate children

IX. When there is neither a will nor a precise law covering the matter, if there are no children the ancestral property should be returned to those from whom it came, or to their children

X. Possessions recently acquired go to the nearest relatives

XI. Diversity of laws about succession

XII. What is the manner of succession in hereditary kingdoms

XIII. That if hereditary kingdoms are indivisible the eldest child is given preference

XIV. That in case of doubt a kingdom which is hereditary only with the consent of the people is indivisible

XV. That the right to such kingdoms does not continue beyond the last descendants of the first king

XVI. That in such kingdoms illegitimate children have no right of succession

XVII. That in such a kingdom male descendants are preferred to female descendants of the same degree of relationship

XVIII. That among the male descendants the eldest is given preference

XIX. Whether such a kingdom is a part of an inheritance

XX. That the presumption is that such a form of succession was established in the kingship as was customary in other things at the time of the founding of the kingdom. First, if the royal power is free from rights of tenure

XXI. Secondly, if the royal power is held as a fief

XXII. What cognate lineal succession is; and of what character the transmission of right in it is

XXIII. What agnate lineal succession is

XXIV. The succession in which nearness of relationship to the first king is always considered

XXV. Whether a son can he disinherited in respect to succession to the throne

XXVI. Whether any one can abdicate the throne for himself and his children

XXVII. Absolute decision regarding the succession belongs neither to the king nor the people

XXVIII. That a son born before the father came to the throne should have preference over one born afterward

XXIX. The rule stated holds unless it appears that the kingship was conferred under a different condition

XXX. The question whether the son of an older son is to be given preference to a younger son ; explanation, with a distinction

XXXI. Likewise, whether a surviving younger brother of the king ought to be given preference over the son of an older brother

XXXII. Whether the son of a brother should be preferred to an uncle of the king

XXXIII. Whether the son of a son should have preference over the daughter of a king

XXXIV. Whether a younger grandson, born of a son, has preference over an older grandson, born of a daughter

XXXV. Whether a granddaughter born of an older son should be preferred to a younger son

XXXVI. Whether the son of a sister ought to be preferred to the daughter of a brother

XXXVII. Whether the daughter of an older brother takes precedence over a younger brother

I. That many rights are said to have their origin in the law of nations, of which, if we speak accurately, this is not true

II. That fish in ponds and wild animals confined in parks are private property according to the law of nature, contrary to the ruling of the Roman law

III. That wild beasts, even if they have escaped, are none the less the property of those who captured them, if they can be properly identified

IV. Whether possession may be acquired with the help of appliances, and how?

V. That it is not contrary to the law of nations that wild creatures should be the property of kings

VI. How the possession of other things lacking an owner may be acquired

VII. Tο whom a treasure-trove naturally falls ; the diversity of the laws on this subject

VIII. That the regulations of the Roman law regarding islands and alluvial deposits belong neither to the law of nature nor to the law of nations

IX. That by the law of nature an island in a river and a dried out bed belong to the one who owned the river or the part of the river, that is, to the people

X. That by the law of nature in an inundation the ownership of the land is not lost

[200] XI. That in cases of doubt alluvial deposits also belong to the people

XII. But that such alluvial deposits seem to be conceded to those whose lands have no other boundary than the river

XIII. That the same opinion is to be held in regard to a bank abandoned by a river, and a part of the bed that has dried out

XIV. What is to be considered alluvial deposit and what an island

XV. When alluvial deposits belong to vassals

XVI. Answer to the arguments by which the Roman jurists defend their law as the law of nature

XVII. Naturally a road prevents gain by alluvial addition

XVIII. That it is not according to nature that the ownership of the offspring should be determined from the mother alone

XIX. That according to nature a thing fashioned out of another's material becomes common property in the same manner as in the intermingling of properties

XX. The principle stated holds true even if the material has been intentionally injured

XXI. That it is not natural that a thing of less value should be absorbed by one of greater worth on account of superiority in value. Here also errors of the Roman jurists are noted

XXII. That by planting, sowing, or building on another’s ground a community of ownership naturally is produced

XXIII. That in community of ownership a person who merely has possession of a thing is not entitled to the income of it, but can charge for expenses incurred

XXIV. The same right holds even if possession has been obtained fraudulently

XXV. That actual delivery is not required naturally in order to establish transfer of ownership

XXVI. The application of what has thus far been said

I. Ownership and sovereignty cease when he who possessed the right is taken away and leaves no successor

II. Similarly the rights of a family are extinguished when the family dies out

III. So also the rights of a people are extinguished if the people ceases to exist

IV. Such extinction takes place if the essential parts have been destroyed

V. The rights of a people are extinguished when the body of the people as a whole is broken up

VI. The rights of a people are extinguished when the form of organization, under which the people exists, is destroyed

VII. The rights of a people are not extinguished by reason of migration

VIII. Such rights are not extinguished by a change of government; and herein also the question of what is due to a new king or to a liberated people is treated

IX. What becomes of such rights if peoples are joined together ?

X. What becomes of such rights if a people is divided ?

XI. Who is now possessor of the rights which once belonged to the Roman Empire, in so far as they do not appear to have been alienated ?

XII. Concerning the rights of heirs

XIII. Concerning the rights of the conqueror

I. The origin and nature of the obligation to restore the property of another to its owner

II. The obligation to restore any gain that a person has made from another’s property ; this is illustrated by many examples

III. That a person who has honestly come into possession of another's property is not bound to make restitution, if the property has perished

IV. That such a possessor of another's property is bound to restore the income that still remains

V. That such a possessor is likewise bound to make good the income which has been used up, if under other circumstances he would have used an equivalent

VI. That such a possessor is not bound to restore income which he neglected to collect

VII. That such a possessor is not bound to make restitution of the property which he has given to another ; herewith a distinction

VIII. That such a possessor, again, is not under obligation if he has sold a thing which he has bought ; likewise herewith a distinction

IX. When a person, who in good faith has bought property of another, can reserve the cost, or a part thereof

X. That purchased goods, if they belong to another, cannot rightfully be returned to the seller

XI. That a person who has in his possession property of which the owner is unknown is not bound to turn it over to any one

XII. That according to the law of nature money received for a shameful cause, or under other circumstances for an act which one is under obligation to perform, does not have to be restored

XIII. Refutation of the opinion that ownership of goods which are weighed, counted, or measured, changes without the consent of the owner

I. Refutation of the opinion that by the law of nature a right does not arise from promises

II. That bare assertion does not create a binding obligation

III. That by the law of nature a promise is binding, but that no legal right is thereby gained by another

IV. What the kind of promise is by which a second party acquires a legal right

V. That for a perfect promise the possession of reason on the part of the promisor is requisite ; herein the law of nature is distinguished from the civil statutes in regard to minors

VI. Whether a promise given under a misapprehension is by the law of nature binding, and to what extent

[223] VII. That a promise made under the influence of fear is binding, but that the person who caused the fear is under obligation to secure the release of the promisor

VIII. That, in order that a promise may be valid, that which is promised ought to be within the power of the promisor

IX. Whether by the law of nature a promise to do an illegal act is binding ; explanation, with a distinction

X. What should be thought of a promise made to obtain a thing which was already due before the promise

XI. The method of making a firm and binding promise in person

XII. The method of making a binding promise through the agency of others ; also concerning ambassadors who exceed their powers

XIII. To what extent obligations incurred through the agency of ship-captains and through business agents arise from the law of nature ; wherein also an error of the Roman law is pointed out

XIV. That the acceptance of a promise is necessary to make it binding

XV. Whether an acceptance ought to be made known to the promisor ; explanation, with a distinction

XVI. That a promise can be revoked if the one to whom it was made died before accepting it

XVII. Whether a promise is revoked on the death of an intermediary ; explanation, with distinctions

XVIII. Whether a promise is revocable after acceptance by a proxy ; explanation, with distinctions

XIX. At what time a burdensome condition can be added to a promise

XX. How an invalid promise can be made binding

XXI. That promises without cause are not void by the law of nature

XXII. To what degree a person who has promised an act of another is bound by the law of nature

I. The division of men’s acts which are advantageous to other men; first, into simple acts and acts of a mixed character

II. The division of simple acts into those that are merely acts of kindness and those that involve a mutual obligation—

III. Also into reciprocal acts, which sometimes separate the parties

IV. Reciprocal acts that sometimes contribute to a community of interests

V. That acts of mixed character may be mixed in respect to their main elements

VI. Or such acts may be of mixed character only by reason of an additional act

VII. What acts are called contracts

VIII. That equality is required in contracts ; and first, equality as regards preceding acts

IX. That equality is required, in contracts as regards knowledge of the facts

X. That equality is required in contracts as regards freedom of choice

XI. Secondly, that equality is required in the act oj making a contract, if it be a contract requiring an exchange

XII. Thirdly, there should be equality in the subject of the contract ; explanation thereof

XIII. What equality ought to obtain in acts that are wholly acts of kindness, or partly acts of kindness

XIV. In what way the price of an object ought to be estimated in a sale, and for what reasons it may justly increase or decrease

XV. When according to the law of nature a sale is completed, and when ownership is transferred

XVI. What monopolies are contrary to the law of nature or the law of love

XVII. How money serves as the medium of exchange

XVIII. By the law of nature nothing should be deducted from the price of rent on account of unfruitfulness or similar misfortunes ; also what rule holds if the first renter is hindered from using a thing and it has been rented by another

XIX. How a just payment for services may be increased or diminished

XX. By what right interest is forbidden

XXI. What advantages do not come under the head of interest

XXII. What the force of the civil laws is in this matter

XXIII. What valuation ought to be put on a contract for securing against loss or insuring

XXIV. What rule applies in the case of a partnership ; wherein many kinds of partnerships are explained

XXV. Concerning joint undertakings for maritime operations

XXVI. According to the law of nations, so far as external acts are concerned, no consideration is given to an inequality in terms which has been agreed to ; in what sense this may be said to be consistent with the law of nature

I. How great the force of an oath is, even in the opinion of heathen peoples

II. That a deliberate intention is required, that is, that a person has willed to take oath

III. That the words of an oath are binding in the sense in which it is believed that they were understood by the one to whom the oath was sworn

IV. When an oath procured by means of fraud is binding

V. That the words of an oath should not be stretched beyond the meaning supported by ordinary use

VI. That an oath to perform an unlawful act is not binding

VII. That an oath is not binding which hinders a greater moral good

VIII. That an oath is not binding to perform an act which is impossible

[246] IX. What if an act, for which an oath has been taken, is impossible for the time being ?

X. That an oath is sworn in the name of God, and in what sense

XI. But that an oath is sworn also in the name of other things with respect to God

XII. That an oath is binding even if one swears by false gods

XIII. The effects of an oath ; hence from an oath a twofold obligation arises, one at the moment of the oath, another afterward ; this is clearly explained

XIV. When, as a result of an oath, a right is acquired for a man and for God ; when for God alone

[248] XV. Refutation of the opinion that one who has given his oath to a pirate or a tyrant is not obligated to God

XVI. Whether one who has given his oath to a faithless person ought to keep his oath ; explanation, with a distinction

XVII. That when a person has given his oath to God alone his heir is in no degree obligated

XVIII. That he is not guilty of perjury who does not keep his oath to a person that does not wish to have it kept, or in case the special character of the person, to whom the oath was sworn because of that character, has been laid aside

XIX. When anything which is done contrary to an oath becomes void

XX. What power the act of superiors has with respect to that which a subject has sworn, or with respect to an oath given to a subject, is set forth, with distinctions

XXI. To what kind of oath the teachings of Christ in regard to not taking an oath are properly applicable

XXII. What unsworn pledge of good faith has by custom the force of an oath

I. The opinion that restitution in full, which arises from municipal law, pertains to the acts of kings as such, is refuted ; also, that a king is not bound by an oath

II. Tο what acts of kings the laws apply is set forth, with distinctions

III. When a king is bound by his oath, and when not

IV. How far a king is bound with reference to things which he promised without cause

V. Application of what has been said about the force of law as regards the contracts of kings

VI. In what sense a king may rightly be said to be under obligation to his subjects by the law of nature only, and also by municipal law

VII. In what way a right lawfully obtained by subjects may be taken away

VIII. Here the distinction between rights gained by the law of nature and by municipal law is rejected

IX. Whether the contracts of kings are laws, and when

X. In what way the contracts of kings are binding on the heirs of all their possessions

XI. In what way those who succeed to the kingship only may he hound by the same contracts

XII. Tο what extent those who succeed to the kingship only may be bound by the same contracts

XIII. What grants of kings are revocable, and what are not, is set forth, with a distinction

XIV. Whether the rightful possessor of the throne is bound by the contracts of usurpers

I. What public conventions are

II. Conventions are divided into treaties, sponsions, and other agreements

III. The difference between treaties and sponsions ; to what extent sponsions are binding

IV. Rejection of the classification of treaties which Menippus made

V. The classification of treaties: first, treaties which establish the same rights as the law of nature ; whence this arises

[265] VI. Treaties which add something beyond the rights of the law of nature ; what treaties are on equal terms

VII. What treaties on unequal terms are ; such treaties, again, are subdivided

VIII. That treaties with those who are strangers to the true religion are permissible by the law of nature

IX. That treaties with those who are strangers to the true religion are not, generally speaking, prohibited by the Hebraic law

X. That treaties with those who are strangers to the true religion are not prohibited by the Christian law

XI. Cautions in regard to such treaties

XII. That all Christians are under obligation to enter a league against the enemies of Christianity

XIII. Tο which ally help should by preference be given when several are at war, is explained, with distinctions

XIV. Whether an alliance may be considered as tacitly renewed

XV. Whether the one party may be freed by the perfidy of the other

XVI. Tο what the signers are bound if a sponsion signed by them is rejected ; also concerning the sponsion of the Caudine Forks

XVII. Whether a sponsion that has not been rejected is made binding through knowledge of it and through silence is set forth, with distinctions ; likewise concerning the sponsion of Luctatius

I. How promises are outwardly binding

II. If other implications are lacking, words are to be understood in their ordinary sense

III. Technical terms are to be explained according to their technical use

IV. Resort is to be had to conjectures in the case of ambiguous and contradictory expressions, or if conjectures naturally suggest themselves

V. Conjectures from the subject-matter

VI. Conjectures from the effect

VII. Conjectures from elements that are connected, either in origin or also in place

VIII. To what the conjecture drawn from reasonable motive applies ; and when, and how, it is in point

IX. The distinction between broad and narrow meanings

X. Division of promises into favourable, odious, mixed, and median

XI. The rejection of the distinction between contracts of good faith and those of strict legal right in relation to the acts of peoples and kings

XII. In accordance with the distinctions of meanings and promises stated, rules are formulated in regard to interpretations

XIII. Whether under the term ‘ allies ’ future allies are included, and in what degree ; also, concerning the treaty of the Romans with Hasdrubal, and similar controversies

XIV. In what way the clause, that one people may not make war without the consent of the other, ought to be interpreted

XV. Concerning the words ‘ Carthage shall be free ’

XVI. What compacts are to be considered personal, and what real, is set forth, with distinctions

XVII. That a treaty entered into with a king is continued with him though he may have been expelled from his kingdom

XVIII. That such a treaty does not apply to the usurper of a kingdom

XIX. To whom a promise is due if it was made to the one who should do something first, and several have done the thing at the same time

XX. A conjecture which presents itself in the one case broadens the meaning ; when this occurs

XXI. Herein also concerning the execution of a mandate in a different way

XXII. In the other case the coiijecture restricts the meaning ; and this may happen by reason of an original defect in the intent, which is inferred from its absurdity

XXIII. Conjecture may restrict the meaning by reason of the cessation of the only reason

XXIV. Conjecture may restrict the meaning by reason of a defect in the subject-matter

XXV. An observation concerning the conjectures last mentioned

XXVI. Or conjecture may restrict the meaning when a case which arises is incompatible with the intent; and this is assumed in regard to what is unlawful

XXVII. Conjecture may restrict the meaning when the condition is too burdensome as regards the act

XXVIII. Conjecture may be restricted in view of other indications, as when the parts of a document are in conflict

XXIX. What rules ought to be observed in such cases

XXX. That in a doubtful case a written document is not required for the validity of a contract

XXXI. The contracts of kings are not to be interpreted according to Roman law

XXXII. Whether the words of the one who accepts the condition, or the words of the one who offers it, ought to carry greater weight, is set forth, with a distinction

XXVIII. Conjecture may be restricted in view of other indications, as when the farts of a document are in conflict

XXIX. What rules ought to be observed in such cases

XXX. That in a doubtful case a written document is not required for the validity of a contract

XXXI. The contracts of kings are not to be interpreted according to Roman law

XXXII. Whether the words of the one who accepts the condition, or the words of the one who offers it, ought to carry greater weight, is set forth, with a distinction

I. That fault creates the obligation to make good the loss

II. That damage is understood to be that which conflicts with one’s right taken in a strict sense

III. That aptitude must be carejully distinguished from legal right in a strict sense, when they coexist

IV. That damage extends also to income

V. How the principle stated applies to the cessation of income

VI. Those who by their act cause damage primarily

VII. Those who by their act cause damage secondarily

VIII. Likewise those who by not doing what they ought cause damage primarily

IX. Those who by not doing as they ought cause damage secondarily

X. What kind of effective participation in the act is requisite to create such obligation

XI. In what order such persons are held liable

XII. That the liability is extended even to resulting damage

XIII. An example in homicide

XIV. An example of one who has used violence in a different way

XV. Of the adulterer and seducer

XVI. Of a thief, robber, and others

XVII. Of one, who has procured a promise through deceit or an unjust fear

XVIII. What if the promise has been motived by a just fear according to the law of nature ?

XIX. What of the fear, which is considered just by the law of nations ?

XX. To what extent civil authorities are liable for loss caused by their subjects ; wherein is the question of captures made at sea from allies contrary to public command

XXI.—That according to the law of nature no one is liable for damage done by his animal or his vessel without his fault

XXII.—That damage may be caused to reputation and honour, and how it may be repaired

I. That certain obligations, such as the right of legation, have their origin in the law of nations

II. Among whom the right of legation is in force

III. Whether an embassy ought always to be admitted

IV. Against ambassadors, who are undertaking dangerous missions, defence is permissible, but not the exaction of a penalty

V. That the person to whom, the ambassador was not sent is not bound by the right of legation

VI. That the enemy to whom an ambassador has been sent is bound by the law

VII. That the right of retaliation cannot be claimed against ambassadors

VIII. The right of ambassadors is also extended to the suite of an ambassador, if the ambassador has desired it

IX. The right of ambassadors is extended likewise to their movable goods

X. Examples of an obligation without the right of compulsion

XI. Of how great importance this right of legation is

I. The right of burial of the dead has its origin in the same law of nations

II. Whence the right arose

III. That burial is due also to public enemies

IV. Whether the right of burial is obligatory in the case of notorious criminals

V. Whether the right of burial is obligatory in the case of those who kill themselves

VI. What other rights impose obligation by virtue of the law of nations

I. Definition and origin of -punishment

II. That punishment is related to expletive justice, and in what way

III. That nature does not determine to whom punishment is due, but that according to the law of nature those free from like offences may exact punishment

IV. That punishment having in view some advantage must among men be inflicted differently than by God ; and why

V. In what sense vengeance may be forbidden by nature

VI. The threefold advantage of punishment

VII. Proof that punishment for the good of the wrong-doer may be exacted by any one at all according to the law of nature

VIII. Likewise for the good of him who has been wronged, where it concerns vengeance permitted by universal common law

IX. Likewise for the good of the whole

X. What the law of the Gospel has established in this matter

XI. The answer to the argument drawn from the mercy of God revealed in the Gospel

XII. Answer to the argument drawn from the exclusion of repentance

XIII. A rejection of incomplete classifications of punishments

XIV. It is not safe for Christians, as private citizens, to exact punishment, even when universal common law allows it

XV. Neither should Christians of their own accord be too zealous in making accusations

XVI. Nor should Christians seek the office of criminal judge

XVII. The distinction between human laws which confer the right to kill as a punishment and those which merely give impunity for such action

XVIII. Internal acts are not punishable by men

XIX. Extrinsic acts which human frailty cannot avoid are not punishable by men

XX. Acts by which human society is not injured, directly or indirectly, are not punishable by men. The explanation thereof

XXI. A refutation of the view that pardon is never permissible

XXII. Proof that pardon is permissible prior to the penal law

[331] XXIII. But pardon is not permissible in all cases

XXIV. Proof that pardon is permissible even after the establishment of the penal law

XXV. What intrinsic causes are sufficient to cause the suspension of the law

XXVI. What extrinsic causes are sufficient

XXVII. Rejection of the view that there is no just cause to suspend the law, unless it is one that is contained in the law as an implied exception

XXVIII. The measure of punishment according to what is deserved

XXIX. A consideration, in this connexion, of the causes which lead to crime, and a comparison of these with one another

XXX. Also a consideration of the causes that should have restrained from sin ; with a discussion of the order of the commandments of the decalogue that apply to one's neighbour, and some other things

XXXI. Also the inclination of the sinner toward incentives to and deterrents from sinning, which is considered from various points of view

XXXII. The desert of punishment may be extended to include a greater harm than the sinner has actually inflicted. The reasons therefor

XXXIII. Rejection of the idea of a harmonic proportion in punishments

XXXIV. Punishment may be mitigated on the ground of regard for others, unless a greater regard for others opposes

XXXV. How the opportunity to commit sin may urge to its punishment ; also how the habit of sinning may urge to the punishment of the sin or dissuade from it

XXXVI. The use of clemency in mitigating punishments

XXXVII. What the Jews and the Romans thought should be taken into consideration in punishments is brought into relation with the foregoing discussion

XXXVIII. On war waged to inflict punishment

XXXIX. By distinguishing various cases, it is explained whether a war waged to punish wrongs that have been merely attempted is just

XL. A discussion whether kings and peoples may rightly wage war on account of things done contrary to the law of nature, although not against them or their subjects ; with a refutation of the view that the law of nature requires right of jurisdiction for the exaction of punishment

XLI. The law of nature must be distinguished from widely current national customs

XLII. The law of nature must be distinguished also from the Divine law that is not voluntarily recognized by all

XLIII. In the law of nature we must distinguish between what is evident and what is not evident

XLIV. Whether war may be waged on account of crimes against God

XLV. What ideas of God are most generally accepted ; and how these are indicated in the first commandments of the Decalogue

XLVI. Those who first do violence to these common ideas may he punished

XLVII. But we may not punish others in like manner, as is shown by an argument from the Hebraic law

XLVIII. Wars cannot justly be waged against those who are unwilling to accept the Christian religion

XLIX. Wars are justly waged against those who treat Christians with cruelty for the sake of their religion alone

L. Wars may not be justly waged against those who err in the interpretation of the Divine law ; as is proven by authorities and examples

LI.—But war may justly be waged against those who show impiety toward the gods they believe in

I. How punishment may pass to those who have shared in the crime

II. A community, or its rulers, may be held responsible for the crime of a subject if they know of it and do not prevent it when they could and should prevent it

III. Likewise a community, or its rulers, may be held responsible for refuge afforded to those who have done wrong elsewhere

IV. Such responsibility rests upon a community or its rulers unless they either punish or surrender the guilty parties, as is shown by examples

V. The rights of suppliants belong to the unfortunate, and not to the guilty, with exceptions

VI. Nevertheless suppliants are to be protected pending the hearing of their case ; under what law the hearing is to be conducted

VII. How subjects share in the crimes of their rulers, and members of a community in those of the community ; and how the punishment of a community differs from that of individuals

VIII. How long the right of inflicting punishment upon a community continues

IX. Whether punishment may be shared without sharing the crime

X. The distinction between that which is inflicted directly and that which comes as a consequence

XI. The distinction between what is done owing to the occasion of a crime and what is done owing to the cause of the crime

XII. That, properly speaking, no one may be justly punished for another’s wrong, and why

XIII. That children may not be punished for the sins of their parents

XIV. Answer is made concerning the acts of God with regard to the children of the wicked

XV. Much the less are other relatives to be punished

XVI. Nevertheless to children and relatives of the guilty something may be denied which they otherwise could have had ; instances thereof

XVII. Subjects may not properly be punished for a wrong committed by their king

XVIII. Individuals, who have not consented thereto, cannot be punished for the wrong-doing of the community

XIX. Heirs are not subject to punishment as such ; reasons therefor

XX. Nevertheless heirs may be subject to punishment if this has passed over into an obligation of another kind

I. The distinction between justifiable and persuasive causes is explained

II. Wars which lack causes of either sort are wars of savages

III. Wars which have persuasive but not justifying causes are wars of robbers

IV. There are certain causes which present a false appearance of justice

V. Such a cause is the fear of something uncertain

VI. Another such cause is advantage apart from necessity

VII. A cause of war presenting the appearance of justice is the refusal of marriage, when there is a great abundance of marriageable women

VIII. Such a cause, again, is the desire for richer land

IX. Such a cause is also the discovery of things previously taken over by others

X. What course is to be followed if the previous occupants are insane

XI. An unjust cause of war is the desire for freedom among a subject people

[387] XII. An unjust cause of war also is the desire to rule others against their will on the pretext that it is for their good

XIII. An unjust cause of war is the title to universal empire which some give to the Emperor, and which is shown to be inapplicable

XIV. An unjust cause of war is the title to universal empire which others give to the Church, and which also is shown to be inapplicable

XV. An unjust cause of war is also the desire to fulfil prophecies, without the command of God

XVI. An unjust cause of war is also the desire to obtain something that is owed by an obligation not strictly legal but arising from some other source

XVII. The difference between a war the cause of which is unjust and a war in which there is a wrong of another kind ; and the different effects of each

I. On the source of the causes of doubt in moral questions

[394] II. Nothing is to be done contrary to the dictates of one’s mind, however erroneous they may be

III. One's judgement may be influenced in either direction by arguments from facts

IV. One's judgement may be influenced in either direction by authority

V. If in a weighty matter there is doubt on both sides, and one of two courses must be chosen, that which is the safer is to be adopted

VI. Whence it follows that in case of doubt we must refrain from war

VII. First, war may be obviated by a conference

VIII. Second, war may be obviated by arbitration ; with a discussion of the duty of Christian kings in regard to warring parties

IX. Third, war may be obviated even by lot

X. Whether single combat may be permitted as a means of avoiding war

XI.—Where the doubt on either side is equal, he who is in possession has the more advantageous position

[398] XII. When the doubt on either side is equal, if neither party is in possession the thing under dispute should be divided

XIII. The question whether a war may be just from the view-point of both parties is discussed, with many qualifications

I. Often a right should be given up in order to avoid war

II. Especially the right to inflict punishments ought to be given up in order to avoid war

III. A right should be given up, especially by a king who has been wronged, in order to avoid war

IV. Even for the sake of one's self and one's dependants a ruler must often refrain from war

V. Rules dictated by prudence regarding the choice between things that are good

VI. An example in a deliberation between devotion to freedom and devotion to peace ; whereby the slaughter of a people may be avoided

VII. He who is not much the stronger ought to refrain from exacting penalties

VIII. It results that war is not to be undertaken, unless of necessity

IX. Again, war is not to be undertaken save from a most weighty cause at a most opportune time

X. The evils of war placed, before our eyes

I. War may rightfully he undertaken on behalf of subjects

II. Yet war is not always to be undertaken on behalf of subjects

III. Whether an innocent subject may be surrendered to an enemy, in order that danger may be avoided

IV. Wars may rightfully be undertaken also on behalf of allies of equal or unequal standing

V. Wars may rightfully be undertaken on behalf of friends

VI. Wars, finally, may rightfully be undertaken on behalf of any persons whatsoever

VII. Nevertheless the obligation to undertake war may be disregarded without wrong, if one fears for himself, or even for the life of an innocent person

VIII. The question whether a war for the defence of subjects of another power is rightful is explained by a distinction

IX. Military alliances and mercenary service without dissemination regarding the causes of war are unjust

X. It is also particularly wrong to take service merely for the sake of plunder or pay

I. Who may be said to be under the rule of another

II. What those under the rule of another should do if they are summoned to share in deliberation, or have a free choice of action

III. If those under the rule of another should be ordered to go to war, and should believe the cause of the war to be unjust, they ought not to serve

IV. What they who are under the rule of another, and are ordered to go to war, should do if they are in doubt

V. Sense of duty requires that subjects who doubt in regard to the justness of a war should be spared, but the burden of an extraordinary tax may be imposed upon them

VI. When it may be just for subjects to bear arms in a war that is unjust