Hugo Grotius on The law of warand peace - Book III
597-[948]
Chapter I General rules from the law of nature regarding what is permissible in war; with a consideration of ruses and falsehood
599-622
I. The order of treatment in the discussion which follows
599
II. The first rule: In war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible. This is explained
599-600
III. The second rule : A right is to be viewed as arising not only from the origin of the war but also from causes which subsequently develop
600
IV. The third rule: Some things, which are not permissible according to the purpose of a war, may follow therefrom without wrong; a precaution is added
600-601
V. What is permissible against those who furnish supplies to our enemies is explained through distinctions
601-605
VI. Whether it is permissible to use a ruse in war
605-606
VII. In a negative action, deceit is not in itself impermissible
607
VIII. Deceit in a positive action falls under two heads: deceit exhibited in actions not limited in significance, and that exhibited in actions the significance of which is, as it were, fixed by agreement; it is shown that deceit of the former sort is permissible
607-609
IX. The difficulty of the inquiry in respect to the second sort of deceit is indicated
609-611
X. Not every use of an expression, which is known to be taken in another sense, is unpermissible
611-613
XI. The character of falsehood, in so far as it is unpermissible, consists in its conflict with the right of another ; this is explained
613-614
XII. The view is maintained that it is permissible to say what is false before infants and insane persons
614
XIII. It is permissible to say what is false when he to whom the conversation is not addressed is deceived, and when it would be permissible to deceive him if not sharing in it
615
XIV. It is permissible to say what is false when the conversation is directed to him who wishes to be deceived in this way
615-616
XV. It is permissible to say what is false when the speaker makes use of a superior right over one subject to himself
616-617
XVI. It is perhaps permissible to say what is false when we are unable in any other way to save the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance
617
XVII. The authors who have judged that falsehood spoken in the presence of enemies is permissible
618-619
XVIII. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to statements containing a promise
619
XIX. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to oaths
619-620
XX. Nevertheless it is more noble, and more becoming to Christian simplicity, to refrain from falsehood even toward an enemy; this view is illustrated by comparisons
620-622
XXI. It is not permissible for us to force any one to do what is right for us but not for him
622
XXII. Nevertheless we may make use of assistance voluntarily offered
622
Chapter II How by the law of nations the goods of subjects may be held for the debt of their rulers; and therein, on reprisals
623-
I. By natural law no one except an heir is bound by the act of another
623
II. Nevertheless it has been established by the law of nations that both the possessions and the acts of subjects are liable for the debt of a ruler
624-625
[445] III. An example in the seizure of persons
625-626
IV. An example in the seizure of goods
626-627
V. Seizure is warranted after a right has been denied, and when it may properly be considered as settled that this has been done; wherein it is shown that a judicial decision does not properly give or take away a right
627-628
VI. Such seizure does not warrant the taking of human life
628
VII. The distinction between what there is relating to this matter in municipal law and in the law of nations
628-629
Chapter III On war that is lawful or public according to the law of nations; and therein, on the declaration of war
630-640
I. A public war according to the law of nations is a war between different peoples
630
II. The distinction between a people, although acting unjustly, and pirates or brigands
631-632
III. Sometimes a transformation is effected
632-633
IV. It is essential to the nature of a public war that it should have the support of the sovereign power; in what way this is to be understood
633
V. A declaration of war is also requisite
633-634
VI. What element in the declaration of war is in accordance with the law of nature, and what is peculiar to the law of nations, is set forth with distinctions
634-635
VII. A declaration of war is sometimes conditional, sometimes absolute
635-637
VIII. What elements in declarations of war pertain to municipal law and not to the law of nations
637-638
IX. A war declared against any one is at the same time declared against his subjects and allies, in so far as they take his side
638
X. A war declared against any one is not held to be at the same time declared against his subjects and allies in so far as they are considered by themselves; illustration by examples
638-639
XI. The reason why a declaration is required in order to secure certain effects
639
XII. The effects referred to are not found in other wars
639
XIII. Whether war may he waged simultaneously with its declaration
639-640
XIV. Whether war must be declared against him who has violated the right of embassy
640
[456] Chapter IV On the right of killing enemies in a public war, and on other violence against the person
641-657
I. The effects of a public war are explained in general terms
641
II. A distinction is made between the word ‘permissible’ as referring to that which is done with impunity, although not without moral wrong, and to that which is free from moral wrong even if virtue would enjoin not to do it; with examples
641-643
III. The effects of a public war in general are concerned with permission that grants impunity
643-644
IV. Why such effects have been introduced
644
V. Testimony regarding these effects
644-646
VI. Out of this right arises the right to kill and injure all who are in the territory of the enemy
646
VII. What is the situation in case foreigners have entered a country before the outbreak of war?
646
VIII. The right to inflict injury extends to subjects of enemies anywhere, unless the law of the foreign territory prevents it
647-648
IX. The right to inflict injury extends even over infants and women
648-649
X. The right to inflict injury extends even over captives, and without limitation of time
649
XI. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who wish to surrender, but whose surrender is not accepted
649-650
XII. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who have surrendered unconditionally
650
[461] XIII. It is incorrect to refer this right to other causes, as retaliation, or obstinacy of defence
650-651
XIV. The right to inflict injury extends over hostages also
651
XV. By the law of nations it is forbidden to kill any one by means of poison
651-652
XVI. By the law of nations it is forbidden to poison weapons or waters
652-653
XVII. It is not forbidden by the law of nations to pollute waters in another way
653
XVIII. Whether or not the use of assassins is contrary to the law of nations
653-656
XIX. Whether rape is contrary to the law of nations
656-657
[468] Chapter V On devastation and pillage
658-662
I. Enemy property may be destroyed and pillaged
658
II. Even enemy property that is sacred may be destroyed and pillaged; how this is to be understood
658-662
III. Enemy property that is consecrated may be destroyed or pillaged; a caution is added
662
IV. How far deceit is permissible in these matters
662
Chapter VI On the right of acquiring things taken in war
663-689
I. What the law of nature is regarding the acquisition of things taken in war
663-664
II. What the law of nations is; evidences are cited
664-666
III. When a thing capable of being moved may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations
666-667
IV. When territory may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations
667
V. Property which does not belong to the enemy is not acquired by war
667-668
VI. What of goods found in ships of the enemy?
668
VII. Things which our enemies have taken from others by war become ours according to the law of nations; this is attested by evidence
668-670
VIII. The opinion, which holds that things taken from the enemy become the property of the individuals who capture them, is refuted
670
IX. By the law of nature both possession and ownership may be acquired through another
670-671
X. The distinction between hostile acts as public or private
671
[477] XI. Territory is acquired for a people, or for him whose war it is
672
XII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, become the property of the individuals who take them
672-673
XIII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, do not become the property of individuals if the municipal law determines otherwise
673
XIV. Things captured by a public act become the property of the people or of him whose war it is
673-675
XV. Nevertheless in such things some right of decision is usually granted to commanders
675-676
XVI. Commanders may turn booty over to the public treasury
676-677
XVII. Or commanders may divide the booty among the soldiers; in what way such a division may be made
677-680
XVIII. Or commanders may permit pillaging
680-681
XIX. Or commanders may grant the spoil to others
681
XX. Or commanders, having divided the booty into portions, may employ now one method of distribution and now another; in what way
681-682
XXI. The committing of peculation in the distribution of booty
682-683
XXII. Some change may be made with respect to this common right of booty by a legal enactment or by another’s act of will
683-684
XXIII. Thus booty may be granted to allies
684-685
XXIV. Booty is often granted to subjects; with illustration by means of various examples on land and sea
685-688
XXV. The application of what has been said
688
XXVI. Whether things which have been taken outside the territory of either belligerent may be acquired by the law of war
688-689
XXVII. In what way the right of which we have spoken is peculiar to a public war
689
Chapter VII On the right over prisoners of war
690-696
I. According to the law of nations all persons captured in a war that is public become slaves
690-691
II. Also the descendants of persons captured in war become slaves
691
III. What may be done to prisoners of war with impunity
691
IV. The property of captives, even if incorporeal, belongs to their master
691
V. The reason why the law has thus been established
692-693
VI. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to flee
693-695
VII. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to resist their master
695
VIII. The law under consideration has not always existed among all nations
695-696
IX. The law under consideration does not now exist among Christians; what has been substituted for it
696
Chapter VIII On the right to rule over the conquered
697-700
I. By war also civil authority is acquired, sometimes as vested in a king, sometimes as vested in a people; the effects of such acquisition
697-698
II. The right of a master may be acquired over a people, which then ceases to be a state
698-699
III. Sometimes the two types of authority are mixed
699
IV. The possessions of a people, even such as are incorporeal, are also acquired; herewith is discussed the question of the written bond of the Thessalians
699-700
Chapter IX On postliminy
701-715
I. The origin of the word postliminy
701
II. Where postliminy may occur
701-702
III. By postliminy some things return and some things are recovered
702-703
IV. The right of postliminy exists in peace and in war. What is to be done if it has not been mentioned in time of peace?
703-705
V. When a free man may return by postliminy while war is in progress
705
VI. What rights a free man returning by postliminy may recover, and what he may not recover
705-706
VII. Rights against a free man returning by postliminy also are restored
706
VIII. Why those who surrender do not have the right of postliminy
706
IX. When a people may have the right of postliminy
707
X. What are the provisions of the municipal law in the case of those who return by postliminy
707-709
XI. How slaves are recovered by postliminy, even those who have run away; how those who have been ransomed are recovered
709-710
XII. Whether subjects may be recovered by postliminy
710
XIII. Territory is recovered by postliminy
710-711
XIV. The distinction that was formerly observed with regard to movable things
712
XV. What is the current law with regard to movable things?
712
XVI. What things may he recovered in such a way as not to need postliminy
713
XVII. Charges introduced by municipal law as affecting those subject to it
713
XVIII. How postliminy has been observed among those who were not enemies
713-714
XIX. When the right of postliminy may be enforced at the present day
714-715
Chapter X Cautios in regard to things which are done in an unlawful war
716-721
I. With what meaning a sense of honour may be said to forbid what the law permits
716-717
II. The principle stated is applied to the things which we said were permitted by the law of nations
718
III. What is done by reason of an unjust war is unjust from the point of view of moral injustice
718-719
IV. Who are bound to make restitution, and to what extent
719
V. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who took them
719-720
VI. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who holds them
720-721
Chapter XI Moderation with respect to the right of killing in a lawful war
722-744
I. In a lawful war certain acts are devoid of moral justice; a condition which is explained
722-723
II. Who may be killed in accordance with moral justice
723
III. No one may rightly be killed because of his ill-fortune; for example, those who take sides under compulsion
723-725
IV. No one may rightly be killed on account of a fault that is intermediate between ill-fortune and deceit; the nature of such a fault is explained
725-729
V. Those who are responsible for a war are to be distinguished from those who follow them
729-730
VI. With regard to those who are responsible for a war we must distinguish between causes which may be and those which may not be approved
730-731
VII. Punishment may often be remitted justly even to enemies who have deserved death
731-733
VIII. One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by accident
733-734
IX. Children should always be spared; women, unless they have been guilty of an extremely serious offence; and old men
734-736
X. Those also should be spared whose occupations are solely religious or concerned with letters
736-737
XI. Farmers should be spared
737
XII. Merchants and like persons should be spared
737
XIII. Prisoners of war also should be spared
737-739
XIV. The surrender of those who wish to yield upon fair terms should be accepted
739-740
XV. Those also who have surrendered unconditionally should be spared
740
XVI. What has been stated is true, provided that no serious crime has preceded; how this is to be understood
740-742
XVII. It is right to spare those who are guilty, if their number is very great
742
XVIII. Hostages should not be put to death unless they have themselves done wrong
742-743
XIX. All useless fighting should be avoided
743-744
Chapter XII Moderation in laying waste and similar things
745-756
I. What devastation may be lawful, and in what degree
745-746
II. Devastation should be refrained from if the area is profitable for us and out of the power of the enemy
746-748
III. Devastation should be refrained from if there is good hope for a speedy victory
748-749
[533] IV. Devastation should he refrained from if the enemy has means of subsistence from other sources
749-751
V. Devastation should be refrained from if the thing itself is of no use in furnishing resources for war
751
VI. The principle stated is particularly applicable to things that are sacred or connected with things that are sacred
751-753
VII. The principle is applicable also to consecrated things
753-754
VIII. The advantages which follow from such moderation are pointed out
754-756
[541] Chapter Moderation in regard to captured property
757-76
I. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is to held, up to the amount of their debt
757
II. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is not to be held as punishment for the crime of another
758
III. Here we must understand as debt also indebtedness which arises in time of war. Examples
758-759
IV. In this matter it is an obligation of humaneness not to make the fullest use of one's right
759-760
Chapter XIV Moderation in regard to prisoners of war
761-769
I. Tο what extent, in accordance with moral justice, it is permissible to take men captive
761
II. What is permissible against a slave according to the moral power of justice
761-762
III. It is not permissible to kill an innocent prisoner
763
IV. It is not permissible to punish with severity
763-764
V. It is not permissible to impose upon slaves tasks that are excessively severe
764-765
VI. Under what circumstances the savings of a slave belong to the master, and under what circumstances to the slave
765-768
VII. Whether it is permissible for slaves to attempt to escape
768
VIII. Whether the children of slaves are bound to the master, and to what extent
768-769
IX. What is to be done in countries where the enslavement of prisoners of war is not customary
769
Chapter XV Noderation in the acquisition of overeignty
770-777
I. To what extent moral justice permits sovereignty to be acquired
770
II. It is praiseworthy to abstain from the exercise of the right to acquire sovereignty over the vanquished
770-771
IV. Or by leaving the sovereign power to those who had held it—
772
V. Sometimes by the imposition of garrisons—
772-773
VI. Or even by tributes and similar burdens
773
VII. The advantage derived from such moderation is pointed out
773-774
VIII. Examples; with a discussion of a change in the form of government among the vanquished
774-775
IX. If sovereignty is to be assumed, it is right to leave a part of it to the conquered
775
X. Or, certainly, some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered
775-776
XI. Some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered, especially in the matter of religion
776
XII. At any rate the conquered should be treated with clemency; and why
776-777
Chapter XVI Moderation in regard to those things which by the law of nations have not have not the right of postliminy
778-782
I. Moral justice requires that the things which our enemy has taken from another in an unlawful war shall be restored
778
II. Examples
779-780
III. Whether anything may be deducted from that which is restored
780-781
IV. Even subject peoples or divisions of peoples are to be restored to those to whom they belonged, if they have been unjustly taken over by the enemy
781
V. At what time the obligation to make restoration ceases
781-782
VI. What is to be done in a doubtful case
782
Chapter XVII On those who are of neither side in war
783-787
I. From those who are at peace nothing should be taken except in case of extreme necessity, and subject to the restoration of its value
783
II. Examples of self-restraint and precepts
783-786
III. What the duty of those at peace is towards belligerents
786-787
[564] Chapter XVIII On acts done by individuals in a public war
788-791
I. The question whether it is permissible for individuals to do harm to a public enemy is discussed with special regard to the law of nature, the law of nations, and municipal law
788-789
II. What in respect to the enemy is permitted by moral justice to those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense
789-790
III. What in respect to their own state is lawful for those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense
790
IV. What the rule of Christian love demands of such persons
790-791
V. How a private war may he mingled with a public war
791
VI. The obligation resting upon a person, who has done harm to the enemy without orders, is set forth with a distinction
791
Chapter XIX On good faith between enemies
792-803
I. Good faith is to be kept with enemies of every description
792-793
II. Refutation of the view that faith ought not to be kept with pirates and tyrants
793-794
III. Answer to the argument drawn from the fact that such persons deserve punishment, and the proof that this is not taken into account when they have been treated with
794-795
IV. The fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, if the fear was not felt as a personal fear by him who made the promise
795
V. Or, if an oath has been given, the fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, although in the case of a brigand such an oath is violated with impunity so far as men are concerned
795-796
VI. The same rules are applicable in relation to rebellious subjects
796
VII. The special difficulty presented by promises made to subjects under the right of eminent domain
796-797
VIII. It is shown also that such promises may be confirmed by an oath of the state
797-798
IX. Or, promises are binding if a third person, to whom the promise is made, enters into the case
798
X. How the political character of a state may be changed
798
XI. Fear does not justify an exception in respect to a war that is formal according to the law of nations
798-799
XII. What is to be understood regarding such a fear as the law of nations recognizes
799
XIII. Faith must be kept even with the faithless
799-800
XIV. Faith does not have to be kept if the condition changes; and this takes place if the other does not keep his part of the agreement
800
XV. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return
800-801
XVI. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return, even if this is on another contract
801
XVII. Faith does not have to be kept in case damage has been done
801
XVIII. Furthermore, faith does not have to be kept when something is due as a penalty
802
XIX. How these principles become applicable in war
802-803
[574] Chapter XX On the good faith of states, by which war is ended; also on the working of peace treaties, on decision by lot, on combat by agreement; on arbitration, surrender, hostages, and pledges
804-831
I. Division of good faith between enemies, according to the order of what follows
804
II. In a monarchy the right to make peace belongs to the king
804
III. What if the king is an infant, insane, a captive, or in exile?
804-805
IV. In an aristocracy or a democracy the right of making peace belongs to the majority
805
V. Now the sovereignty, or a part of the sovereignty, or the property of the realm may be validly alienated for the sake of peace
805-806
VI. How far the people, or his successors, are bound, by a peace made by a king
806-807
VII. In arranging peace the property of subjects can be given up for the sake of the public advantage, but with the obligation of making good the loss
807
[577] VIII. What in regard to property already lost in war?
807-808
IX. No distinction is here made between property acquired under the law of nations and under the municipal law
808
X. From the point of view of foreigners public advantage is presumed
808
XI. General rule for the interpretation of peace covenants
808-809
XII. In doubtful cases it is believed that the understanding is that things remain as they are; how this ought to be interpreted
809-810
XIII. What if an agreement has been made, that all things are to be restored to the condition in which they were before the war?
810
XIV. In such cases those who previously were free and of their own accord became subject to another are not restored
810
XV. In case of doubt damages caused by war are considered as remitted
810
XVI. The principle stated does not apply to what was owed to individuals before the war
811
XVII. In case of doubt also punishments, which were publicly due before the war, are considered as remitted
811
XVIII. What of the right of private persons to infiict punishments?
811
XIX. A right, which was publicly alleged before the war, but was in dispute, is easily understood to be in abeyance
811-812
XX. Things captured after the making of peace must be restored
812
XXI. Some rules bearing upon the agreement to restore things captured in war
812
XXII. Regarding income
812
XXIII. On the names of regions
813
XXIV. Concerning reference to a former treaty; and concerning him through whom the failure to perform has come
813
XXV. Concerning delay
813
XXVI. In case of doubt that interpretation should be adopted which is contrary to the interest of the party that made the terms
813-814
XXVII. Distinctions are drawn between furnishing a new cause for war and breaking a treaty
814
XXVIII. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what is contained in every peace
814-815
XXIX. What if allies have made an attack?
815
XXX. What if subjects have so acted? How their action should be considered as approved
815
XXXI. What if subjects should engage in warfare under the command of others?
815-816
XXXII. What if harm has been done to subjects? Herein a distinction is made
816
XXXIII. What if harm has been done to allies? Herein likewise a distinction is made
817
XXXIV. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what has been stated in the peace terms
817
XXXV. Whether a discrimination ought to be made between the articles of the treaty of peace
817
XXXVI. What if a penalty has been added?
818
XXXVII. What if necessity has hindered fulfilment?
818
XXXVIII. Peace continues, if the one injured so desires
818
XXXIX. How peace may be broken by acting contrary to what belongs to the special nature of every peace
818
XL. What falls under the term friendship?
818-819
XLI. Whether it is contrary to friendship to receive subjects and exiles
819-820
XLII. How war may be ended by drawing lots
820
XLIII. How war may be ended by a set combat; and whether this is lawful
820-822
XLIV. Whether the act of kings in such cases binds their peoples
822
XLV. In such combats who is to be judged the victor?
822-823
XLVI. How war may be ended by arbitration; and here arbitration is understood to be without appeal
823-824
XLVII. In case of doubt it is understood that arbitrators are bound to decide according to law
824
XLVIII. Arbitrators ought not to decide concerning possession
825
XLIX. What is the force of surrender pure and simple?
825-826
L. What is the duty of the victor toward those who make an unconditional surrender?
826-828
LI. Concerning conditional surrender
828
LII. Who can, and should, be given as hostages?
828
LIII. What the right over hostages is
828-829
LIV. Whether a hostage may lawfully escape
829
LV. Whether a hostage may be lawfully detained for any other reason
829
LVI. A hostage is set free at the death of the one for whom he came as hostage
829-830
LVII. Whether a hostage may be retained after the death of the king who gave him
830
LVIII. Sometimes hostages are under obligation as principals, and one is not bound for the act of the other
830
LIX. Of what sort is the obligation arising from pledges of property?
830-831
LX. When the right of redemption is lost
831
[592] Chapter XXI On good faith during war; herein also concerning a truce, the right of safe-conduct, and the ransnom of prisoners
832-844
I. What a truce is, and whether this interval is to be considered as peace or war
832-833
II. The derivation of the word
833
III. A new declaration of war after a truce is not necessary
834
IV. How the period of time fixed for a truce ought to be reckoned
834-
V. When a truce begins to be binding
835
VI. What is lawful during a truce
835-836
VII. Whether during a truce it is lawful to retreat and repair walls, and the like
836
VIII. A distinction regarding the seizure of places in time of truce
836-837
IX. Whether, at the end of the truce, one can return who has been detained by force majeure
837
X. Of special agreements in truces and the questions wont to arise therefrom
838
XI. When the terms of a truce have been violated by the one side, the other may begin war
838
XII. What if a penalty, in case of violation of the truce, has been added?
838
XIII. When the acts of private citizens break the truce
839
XIV. What interpretation ought to be put on the right of safe-conduct outside of the period of truce
839
XV. Who may be classed under the term combatants
839
XVI. How, in this connexion, we are to understand the terms go, come, and depart
839
XVII. On the extension of this to persons
840
[597] XVIII. On the extension of safe-conduct to baggage
840
XIX. Who are included under the terms attendants and nationality
840
XX. Whether a right of safe-conduct is annulled by the death of the grantor
841
XXI. What if a right of safe-conduct has been granted subject to the pleasure of the grantor?
841
XXII. Whether security outside of the territory also is due
841
XXIII. The favour of ransoming captives
841
XXIV. Whether ransom may be forbidden by law is explained with the help of a distinction
842
XXV. Can the right to a captive be transferred?
842
XXVI. A ransom can be owed to several by one person
843
XXVII. Whether an agreement can be annulled on the ground that the wealth of the captive was unknown
843
XXVIII. What goods of the captive belong to the captor
843
XXIX. Whether the heir owes the price of ransom is explained, with the help of a distinction
843-844
XXX. Whether a person, who has been released in order to free another, ought to return if the other has died
844
Chapter XXII On the good faith of subordinate powers in war
845-850
I. The kinds of military leaders
845
II. How far an agreement made by military leaders is binding on the supreme authority
845
III. How far such an agreement furnishes occasion for an obligation
846
IV. What, if anything, has been done contrary to instructions? Herein distinctions are presented
846-847
V. Whether in such a case the other party will be under obligation
847
VI. What generals or magistrates are able to do with regard to those of lower rank, or on behalf of them
847-848
VII. Generals do not have the power to make peace
848
VIII. Whether generals may make a truce; herein a distinction
848
IX. What security of persons, and what property, can he given by generals
849
X. Such agreements should be interpreted narrowly; and why
850
XI. How a surrender accepted by a general is to be interpreted
850
XII. How to understand the proviso, ‘if the king or the people has approved’
850
XIII. How to understand the promise to surrender a town
850
Chapter XXIII On good faith of private persons in war
851-856
I. Refutation of the opinion, which holds that private persons are not bound by a pledge given to the enemy
851
II. It is shown that private persons are bound even to a pirate and a brigand; and to what extent
851
III. No exception is here made for a minor
851-852
IV. Whether an error gives release
852
V. Answer to the objection raised from the point of view of public advantage
852-853
[605] 1VI. The previous statements are applied to a pledge given of return to prison
853
VII. The pledge not to return to a certain place; the pledge not to serve as a soldier
853-854
VIII. The pledge not to run away
854
IX. One who has been captured cannot surrender to another
854
X. Whether private persons should be compelled by their rulers to carry out what they have promised
854
XI. What kind of an interpretation ought to be applied in agreements of this sort
855
XII. In what way we are to interpret the terms life, clothing, and the arrival of aid
855
XIII. Who ought to be said to have returned to the enemy
855
XIV. What are adequate reinforcements in the case of a surrender made conditionally?
855
XV. Whatever pertains to the execution of an agreement does not constitute a condition
856
XVI. Regarding hostages given for such agreements
856
Chapter XXIV On implied good faith
857-859
I. How good faith may be tacitly interposed
857
II. An example, in the case of a person who desires to be received under the protection of a people or a king
857
III. An example, in the case of one who asks or grants a parley
857-858
IV. Nevertheless he who asks or grants a parley is not hindered from promoting his own interests, provided that he does not harm the other party to the conference
858
V. Of mute signs which by custom have some meaning
858-859
VI. On the implied approval of a treaty compact
859
VII. When a punishment is impliedly remitted
859
Chapter XXV Conclusion, with admonitions on behalf of good faith and peace
860-862
I. Admonitions to preserve peace
860-861
II. In war peace should always be kept in view
861
III. And peace should also be accepted even at a loss, especially by Christians
861
IV. The consideration stated is useful to the conquered
861
V. The consideration stated is also useful to the conqueror
862
VI. The consideration stated is useful likewise to those whose fortunes are in doubt
862
VII. Peace, when made, must be kept with the utmost scruple
862
VIII. A prayer, and the end of the work
862
Appendix
863-864
From the life of St. Lous, King of France, by Joinville, Chapter LXXXIX
863
From the life of the same, in connexion with the injuctions of St. Louis the King given to his son
863-864
Commentary of Hugo Grotius on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon
[865]-875
[612] The printer to the reader
[866]
Notes on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon
867-875
List of Editions and Translations of the De Jure Belli ac Pacis
877-886
Editions
877-883
Translations
883-886
Dutch
883-884
French
884-885
German
885
English
885-886
Spanish
886
Indexes
[887]-946
Note
[888]
Index of authors cited
889-930
Subject index
[931]-946
The classics of international law
[947]-[948]
Serial cover
Title page
Impressum
Hugo Grotius on The law of warand peace - Book III
597-[948]
Chapter I General rules from the law of nature regarding what is permissible in war; with a consideration of ruses and falsehood
599-622
I. The order of treatment in the discussion which follows
599
II. The first rule: In war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible. This is explained
599-600
III. The second rule : A right is to be viewed as arising not only from the origin of the war but also from causes which subsequently develop
600
IV. The third rule: Some things, which are not permissible according to the purpose of a war, may follow therefrom without wrong; a precaution is added
600-601
V. What is permissible against those who furnish supplies to our enemies is explained through distinctions
601-605
VI. Whether it is permissible to use a ruse in war
605-606
VII. In a negative action, deceit is not in itself impermissible
607
VIII. Deceit in a positive action falls under two heads: deceit exhibited in actions not limited in significance, and that exhibited in actions the significance of which is, as it were, fixed by agreement; it is shown that deceit of the former sort is permissible
607-609
IX. The difficulty of the inquiry in respect to the second sort of deceit is indicated
609-611
X. Not every use of an expression, which is known to be taken in another sense, is unpermissible
611-613
XI. The character of falsehood, in so far as it is unpermissible, consists in its conflict with the right of another ; this is explained
613-614
XII. The view is maintained that it is permissible to say what is false before infants and insane persons
614
XIII. It is permissible to say what is false when he to whom the conversation is not addressed is deceived, and when it would be permissible to deceive him if not sharing in it
615
XIV. It is permissible to say what is false when the conversation is directed to him who wishes to be deceived in this way
615-616
XV. It is permissible to say what is false when the speaker makes use of a superior right over one subject to himself
616-617
XVI. It is perhaps permissible to say what is false when we are unable in any other way to save the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance
617
XVII. The authors who have judged that falsehood spoken in the presence of enemies is permissible
618-619
XVIII. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to statements containing a promise
619
XIX. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to oaths
619-620
XX. Nevertheless it is more noble, and more becoming to Christian simplicity, to refrain from falsehood even toward an enemy; this view is illustrated by comparisons
620-622
XXI. It is not permissible for us to force any one to do what is right for us but not for him
622
XXII. Nevertheless we may make use of assistance voluntarily offered
622
Chapter II How by the law of nations the goods of subjects may be held for the debt of their rulers; and therein, on reprisals
623-
I. By natural law no one except an heir is bound by the act of another
623
II. Nevertheless it has been established by the law of nations that both the possessions and the acts of subjects are liable for the debt of a ruler
624-625
[445] III. An example in the seizure of persons
625-626
IV. An example in the seizure of goods
626-627
V. Seizure is warranted after a right has been denied, and when it may properly be considered as settled that this has been done; wherein it is shown that a judicial decision does not properly give or take away a right
627-628
VI. Such seizure does not warrant the taking of human life
628
VII. The distinction between what there is relating to this matter in municipal law and in the law of nations
628-629
Chapter III On war that is lawful or public according to the law of nations; and therein, on the declaration of war
630-640
I. A public war according to the law of nations is a war between different peoples
630
II. The distinction between a people, although acting unjustly, and pirates or brigands
631-632
III. Sometimes a transformation is effected
632-633
IV. It is essential to the nature of a public war that it should have the support of the sovereign power; in what way this is to be understood
633
V. A declaration of war is also requisite
633-634
VI. What element in the declaration of war is in accordance with the law of nature, and what is peculiar to the law of nations, is set forth with distinctions
634-635
VII. A declaration of war is sometimes conditional, sometimes absolute
635-637
VIII. What elements in declarations of war pertain to municipal law and not to the law of nations
637-638
IX. A war declared against any one is at the same time declared against his subjects and allies, in so far as they take his side
638
X. A war declared against any one is not held to be at the same time declared against his subjects and allies in so far as they are considered by themselves; illustration by examples
638-639
XI. The reason why a declaration is required in order to secure certain effects
639
XII. The effects referred to are not found in other wars
639
XIII. Whether war may he waged simultaneously with its declaration
639-640
XIV. Whether war must be declared against him who has violated the right of embassy
640
[456] Chapter IV On the right of killing enemies in a public war, and on other violence against the person
641-657
I. The effects of a public war are explained in general terms
641
II. A distinction is made between the word ‘permissible’ as referring to that which is done with impunity, although not without moral wrong, and to that which is free from moral wrong even if virtue would enjoin not to do it; with examples
641-643
III. The effects of a public war in general are concerned with permission that grants impunity
643-644
IV. Why such effects have been introduced
644
V. Testimony regarding these effects
644-646
VI. Out of this right arises the right to kill and injure all who are in the territory of the enemy
646
VII. What is the situation in case foreigners have entered a country before the outbreak of war?
646
VIII. The right to inflict injury extends to subjects of enemies anywhere, unless the law of the foreign territory prevents it
647-648
IX. The right to inflict injury extends even over infants and women
648-649
X. The right to inflict injury extends even over captives, and without limitation of time
649
XI. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who wish to surrender, but whose surrender is not accepted
649-650
XII. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who have surrendered unconditionally
650
[461] XIII. It is incorrect to refer this right to other causes, as retaliation, or obstinacy of defence
650-651
XIV. The right to inflict injury extends over hostages also
651
XV. By the law of nations it is forbidden to kill any one by means of poison
651-652
XVI. By the law of nations it is forbidden to poison weapons or waters
652-653
XVII. It is not forbidden by the law of nations to pollute waters in another way
653
XVIII. Whether or not the use of assassins is contrary to the law of nations
653-656
XIX. Whether rape is contrary to the law of nations
656-657
[468] Chapter V On devastation and pillage
658-662
I. Enemy property may be destroyed and pillaged
658
II. Even enemy property that is sacred may be destroyed and pillaged; how this is to be understood
658-662
III. Enemy property that is consecrated may be destroyed or pillaged; a caution is added
662
IV. How far deceit is permissible in these matters
662
Chapter VI On the right of acquiring things taken in war
663-689
I. What the law of nature is regarding the acquisition of things taken in war
663-664
II. What the law of nations is; evidences are cited
664-666
III. When a thing capable of being moved may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations
666-667
IV. When territory may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations
667
V. Property which does not belong to the enemy is not acquired by war
667-668
VI. What of goods found in ships of the enemy?
668
VII. Things which our enemies have taken from others by war become ours according to the law of nations; this is attested by evidence
668-670
VIII. The opinion, which holds that things taken from the enemy become the property of the individuals who capture them, is refuted
670
IX. By the law of nature both possession and ownership may be acquired through another
670-671
X. The distinction between hostile acts as public or private
671
[477] XI. Territory is acquired for a people, or for him whose war it is
672
XII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, become the property of the individuals who take them
672-673
XIII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, do not become the property of individuals if the municipal law determines otherwise
673
XIV. Things captured by a public act become the property of the people or of him whose war it is
673-675
XV. Nevertheless in such things some right of decision is usually granted to commanders
675-676
XVI. Commanders may turn booty over to the public treasury
676-677
XVII. Or commanders may divide the booty among the soldiers; in what way such a division may be made
677-680
XVIII. Or commanders may permit pillaging
680-681
XIX. Or commanders may grant the spoil to others
681
XX. Or commanders, having divided the booty into portions, may employ now one method of distribution and now another; in what way
681-682
XXI. The committing of peculation in the distribution of booty
682-683
XXII. Some change may be made with respect to this common right of booty by a legal enactment or by another’s act of will
683-684
XXIII. Thus booty may be granted to allies
684-685
XXIV. Booty is often granted to subjects; with illustration by means of various examples on land and sea
685-688
XXV. The application of what has been said
688
XXVI. Whether things which have been taken outside the territory of either belligerent may be acquired by the law of war
688-689
XXVII. In what way the right of which we have spoken is peculiar to a public war
689
Chapter VII On the right over prisoners of war
690-696
I. According to the law of nations all persons captured in a war that is public become slaves
690-691
II. Also the descendants of persons captured in war become slaves
691
III. What may be done to prisoners of war with impunity
691
IV. The property of captives, even if incorporeal, belongs to their master
691
V. The reason why the law has thus been established
692-693
VI. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to flee
693-695
VII. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to resist their master
695
VIII. The law under consideration has not always existed among all nations
695-696
IX. The law under consideration does not now exist among Christians; what has been substituted for it
696
Chapter VIII On the right to rule over the conquered
697-700
I. By war also civil authority is acquired, sometimes as vested in a king, sometimes as vested in a people; the effects of such acquisition
697-698
II. The right of a master may be acquired over a people, which then ceases to be a state
698-699
III. Sometimes the two types of authority are mixed
699
IV. The possessions of a people, even such as are incorporeal, are also acquired; herewith is discussed the question of the written bond of the Thessalians
699-700
Chapter IX On postliminy
701-715
I. The origin of the word postliminy
701
II. Where postliminy may occur
701-702
III. By postliminy some things return and some things are recovered
702-703
IV. The right of postliminy exists in peace and in war. What is to be done if it has not been mentioned in time of peace?
703-705
V. When a free man may return by postliminy while war is in progress
705
VI. What rights a free man returning by postliminy may recover, and what he may not recover
705-706
VII. Rights against a free man returning by postliminy also are restored
706
VIII. Why those who surrender do not have the right of postliminy
706
IX. When a people may have the right of postliminy
707
X. What are the provisions of the municipal law in the case of those who return by postliminy
707-709
XI. How slaves are recovered by postliminy, even those who have run away; how those who have been ransomed are recovered
709-710
XII. Whether subjects may be recovered by postliminy
710
XIII. Territory is recovered by postliminy
710-711
XIV. The distinction that was formerly observed with regard to movable things
712
XV. What is the current law with regard to movable things?
712
XVI. What things may he recovered in such a way as not to need postliminy
713
XVII. Charges introduced by municipal law as affecting those subject to it
713
XVIII. How postliminy has been observed among those who were not enemies
713-714
XIX. When the right of postliminy may be enforced at the present day
714-715
Chapter X Cautios in regard to things which are done in an unlawful war
716-721
I. With what meaning a sense of honour may be said to forbid what the law permits
716-717
II. The principle stated is applied to the things which we said were permitted by the law of nations
718
III. What is done by reason of an unjust war is unjust from the point of view of moral injustice
718-719
IV. Who are bound to make restitution, and to what extent
719
V. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who took them
719-720
VI. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who holds them
720-721
Chapter XI Moderation with respect to the right of killing in a lawful war
722-744
I. In a lawful war certain acts are devoid of moral justice; a condition which is explained
722-723
II. Who may be killed in accordance with moral justice
723
III. No one may rightly be killed because of his ill-fortune; for example, those who take sides under compulsion
723-725
IV. No one may rightly be killed on account of a fault that is intermediate between ill-fortune and deceit; the nature of such a fault is explained
725-729
V. Those who are responsible for a war are to be distinguished from those who follow them
729-730
VI. With regard to those who are responsible for a war we must distinguish between causes which may be and those which may not be approved
730-731
VII. Punishment may often be remitted justly even to enemies who have deserved death
731-733
VIII. One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by accident
733-734
IX. Children should always be spared; women, unless they have been guilty of an extremely serious offence; and old men
734-736
X. Those also should be spared whose occupations are solely religious or concerned with letters
736-737
XI. Farmers should be spared
737
XII. Merchants and like persons should be spared
737
XIII. Prisoners of war also should be spared
737-739
XIV. The surrender of those who wish to yield upon fair terms should be accepted
739-740
XV. Those also who have surrendered unconditionally should be spared
740
XVI. What has been stated is true, provided that no serious crime has preceded; how this is to be understood
740-742
XVII. It is right to spare those who are guilty, if their number is very great
742
XVIII. Hostages should not be put to death unless they have themselves done wrong
742-743
XIX. All useless fighting should be avoided
743-744
Chapter XII Moderation in laying waste and similar things
745-756
I. What devastation may be lawful, and in what degree
745-746
II. Devastation should be refrained from if the area is profitable for us and out of the power of the enemy
746-748
III. Devastation should be refrained from if there is good hope for a speedy victory
748-749
[533] IV. Devastation should he refrained from if the enemy has means of subsistence from other sources
749-751
V. Devastation should be refrained from if the thing itself is of no use in furnishing resources for war
751
VI. The principle stated is particularly applicable to things that are sacred or connected with things that are sacred
751-753
VII. The principle is applicable also to consecrated things
753-754
VIII. The advantages which follow from such moderation are pointed out
754-756
[541] Chapter Moderation in regard to captured property
757-76
I. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is to held, up to the amount of their debt
757
II. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is not to be held as punishment for the crime of another
758
III. Here we must understand as debt also indebtedness which arises in time of war. Examples
758-759
IV. In this matter it is an obligation of humaneness not to make the fullest use of one's right
759-760
Chapter XIV Moderation in regard to prisoners of war
761-769
I. Tο what extent, in accordance with moral justice, it is permissible to take men captive
761
II. What is permissible against a slave according to the moral power of justice
761-762
III. It is not permissible to kill an innocent prisoner
763
IV. It is not permissible to punish with severity
763-764
V. It is not permissible to impose upon slaves tasks that are excessively severe
764-765
VI. Under what circumstances the savings of a slave belong to the master, and under what circumstances to the slave
765-768
VII. Whether it is permissible for slaves to attempt to escape
768
VIII. Whether the children of slaves are bound to the master, and to what extent
768-769
IX. What is to be done in countries where the enslavement of prisoners of war is not customary
769
Chapter XV Noderation in the acquisition of overeignty
770-777
I. To what extent moral justice permits sovereignty to be acquired
770
II. It is praiseworthy to abstain from the exercise of the right to acquire sovereignty over the vanquished
770-771
IV. Or by leaving the sovereign power to those who had held it—
772
V. Sometimes by the imposition of garrisons—
772-773
VI. Or even by tributes and similar burdens
773
VII. The advantage derived from such moderation is pointed out
773-774
VIII. Examples; with a discussion of a change in the form of government among the vanquished
774-775
IX. If sovereignty is to be assumed, it is right to leave a part of it to the conquered
775
X. Or, certainly, some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered
775-776
XI. Some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered, especially in the matter of religion
776
XII. At any rate the conquered should be treated with clemency; and why
776-777
Chapter XVI Moderation in regard to those things which by the law of nations have not have not the right of postliminy
778-782
I. Moral justice requires that the things which our enemy has taken from another in an unlawful war shall be restored
778
II. Examples
779-780
III. Whether anything may be deducted from that which is restored
780-781
IV. Even subject peoples or divisions of peoples are to be restored to those to whom they belonged, if they have been unjustly taken over by the enemy
781
V. At what time the obligation to make restoration ceases
781-782
VI. What is to be done in a doubtful case
782
Chapter XVII On those who are of neither side in war
783-787
I. From those who are at peace nothing should be taken except in case of extreme necessity, and subject to the restoration of its value
783
II. Examples of self-restraint and precepts
783-786
III. What the duty of those at peace is towards belligerents
786-787
[564] Chapter XVIII On acts done by individuals in a public war
788-791
I. The question whether it is permissible for individuals to do harm to a public enemy is discussed with special regard to the law of nature, the law of nations, and municipal law
788-789
II. What in respect to the enemy is permitted by moral justice to those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense
789-790
III. What in respect to their own state is lawful for those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense
790
IV. What the rule of Christian love demands of such persons
790-791
V. How a private war may he mingled with a public war
791
VI. The obligation resting upon a person, who has done harm to the enemy without orders, is set forth with a distinction
791
Chapter XIX On good faith between enemies
792-803
I. Good faith is to be kept with enemies of every description
792-793
II. Refutation of the view that faith ought not to be kept with pirates and tyrants
793-794
III. Answer to the argument drawn from the fact that such persons deserve punishment, and the proof that this is not taken into account when they have been treated with
794-795
IV. The fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, if the fear was not felt as a personal fear by him who made the promise
795
V. Or, if an oath has been given, the fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, although in the case of a brigand such an oath is violated with impunity so far as men are concerned
795-796
VI. The same rules are applicable in relation to rebellious subjects
796
VII. The special difficulty presented by promises made to subjects under the right of eminent domain
796-797
VIII. It is shown also that such promises may be confirmed by an oath of the state
797-798
IX. Or, promises are binding if a third person, to whom the promise is made, enters into the case
798
X. How the political character of a state may be changed
798
XI. Fear does not justify an exception in respect to a war that is formal according to the law of nations
798-799
XII. What is to be understood regarding such a fear as the law of nations recognizes
799
XIII. Faith must be kept even with the faithless
799-800
XIV. Faith does not have to be kept if the condition changes; and this takes place if the other does not keep his part of the agreement
800
XV. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return
800-801
XVI. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return, even if this is on another contract
801
XVII. Faith does not have to be kept in case damage has been done
801
XVIII. Furthermore, faith does not have to be kept when something is due as a penalty
802
XIX. How these principles become applicable in war
802-803
[574] Chapter XX On the good faith of states, by which war is ended; also on the working of peace treaties, on decision by lot, on combat by agreement; on arbitration, surrender, hostages, and pledges
804-831
I. Division of good faith between enemies, according to the order of what follows
804
II. In a monarchy the right to make peace belongs to the king
804
III. What if the king is an infant, insane, a captive, or in exile?
804-805
IV. In an aristocracy or a democracy the right of making peace belongs to the majority
805
V. Now the sovereignty, or a part of the sovereignty, or the property of the realm may be validly alienated for the sake of peace
805-806
VI. How far the people, or his successors, are bound, by a peace made by a king
806-807
VII. In arranging peace the property of subjects can be given up for the sake of the public advantage, but with the obligation of making good the loss
807
[577] VIII. What in regard to property already lost in war?
807-808
IX. No distinction is here made between property acquired under the law of nations and under the municipal law
808
X. From the point of view of foreigners public advantage is presumed
808
XI. General rule for the interpretation of peace covenants
808-809
XII. In doubtful cases it is believed that the understanding is that things remain as they are; how this ought to be interpreted
809-810
XIII. What if an agreement has been made, that all things are to be restored to the condition in which they were before the war?
810
XIV. In such cases those who previously were free and of their own accord became subject to another are not restored
810
XV. In case of doubt damages caused by war are considered as remitted
810
XVI. The principle stated does not apply to what was owed to individuals before the war
811
XVII. In case of doubt also punishments, which were publicly due before the war, are considered as remitted
811
XVIII. What of the right of private persons to infiict punishments?
811
XIX. A right, which was publicly alleged before the war, but was in dispute, is easily understood to be in abeyance
811-812
XX. Things captured after the making of peace must be restored
812
XXI. Some rules bearing upon the agreement to restore things captured in war
812
XXII. Regarding income
812
XXIII. On the names of regions
813
XXIV. Concerning reference to a former treaty; and concerning him through whom the failure to perform has come
813
XXV. Concerning delay
813
XXVI. In case of doubt that interpretation should be adopted which is contrary to the interest of the party that made the terms
813-814
XXVII. Distinctions are drawn between furnishing a new cause for war and breaking a treaty
814
XXVIII. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what is contained in every peace
814-815
XXIX. What if allies have made an attack?
815
XXX. What if subjects have so acted? How their action should be considered as approved
815
XXXI. What if subjects should engage in warfare under the command of others?
815-816
XXXII. What if harm has been done to subjects? Herein a distinction is made
816
XXXIII. What if harm has been done to allies? Herein likewise a distinction is made
817
XXXIV. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what has been stated in the peace terms
817
XXXV. Whether a discrimination ought to be made between the articles of the treaty of peace
817
XXXVI. What if a penalty has been added?
818
XXXVII. What if necessity has hindered fulfilment?
818
XXXVIII. Peace continues, if the one injured so desires
818
XXXIX. How peace may be broken by acting contrary to what belongs to the special nature of every peace
818
XL. What falls under the term friendship?
818-819
XLI. Whether it is contrary to friendship to receive subjects and exiles
819-820
XLII. How war may be ended by drawing lots
820
XLIII. How war may be ended by a set combat; and whether this is lawful
820-822
XLIV. Whether the act of kings in such cases binds their peoples
822
XLV. In such combats who is to be judged the victor?
822-823
XLVI. How war may be ended by arbitration; and here arbitration is understood to be without appeal
823-824
XLVII. In case of doubt it is understood that arbitrators are bound to decide according to law
824
XLVIII. Arbitrators ought not to decide concerning possession
825
XLIX. What is the force of surrender pure and simple?
825-826
L. What is the duty of the victor toward those who make an unconditional surrender?
826-828
LI. Concerning conditional surrender
828
LII. Who can, and should, be given as hostages?
828
LIII. What the right over hostages is
828-829
LIV. Whether a hostage may lawfully escape
829
LV. Whether a hostage may be lawfully detained for any other reason
829
LVI. A hostage is set free at the death of the one for whom he came as hostage
829-830
LVII. Whether a hostage may be retained after the death of the king who gave him
830
LVIII. Sometimes hostages are under obligation as principals, and one is not bound for the act of the other
830
LIX. Of what sort is the obligation arising from pledges of property?
830-831
LX. When the right of redemption is lost
831
[592] Chapter XXI On good faith during war; herein also concerning a truce, the right of safe-conduct, and the ransnom of prisoners
832-844
I. What a truce is, and whether this interval is to be considered as peace or war
832-833
II. The derivation of the word
833
III. A new declaration of war after a truce is not necessary
834
IV. How the period of time fixed for a truce ought to be reckoned
834-
V. When a truce begins to be binding
835
VI. What is lawful during a truce
835-836
VII. Whether during a truce it is lawful to retreat and repair walls, and the like
836
VIII. A distinction regarding the seizure of places in time of truce
836-837
IX. Whether, at the end of the truce, one can return who has been detained by force majeure
837
X. Of special agreements in truces and the questions wont to arise therefrom
838
XI. When the terms of a truce have been violated by the one side, the other may begin war
838
XII. What if a penalty, in case of violation of the truce, has been added?
838
XIII. When the acts of private citizens break the truce
839
XIV. What interpretation ought to be put on the right of safe-conduct outside of the period of truce
839
XV. Who may be classed under the term combatants
839
XVI. How, in this connexion, we are to understand the terms go, come, and depart
839
XVII. On the extension of this to persons
840
[597] XVIII. On the extension of safe-conduct to baggage
840
XIX. Who are included under the terms attendants and nationality
840
XX. Whether a right of safe-conduct is annulled by the death of the grantor
841
XXI. What if a right of safe-conduct has been granted subject to the pleasure of the grantor?
841
XXII. Whether security outside of the territory also is due
841
XXIII. The favour of ransoming captives
841
XXIV. Whether ransom may be forbidden by law is explained with the help of a distinction
842
XXV. Can the right to a captive be transferred?
842
XXVI. A ransom can be owed to several by one person
843
XXVII. Whether an agreement can be annulled on the ground that the wealth of the captive was unknown
843
XXVIII. What goods of the captive belong to the captor
843
XXIX. Whether the heir owes the price of ransom is explained, with the help of a distinction
843-844
XXX. Whether a person, who has been released in order to free another, ought to return if the other has died
844
Chapter XXII On the good faith of subordinate powers in war
845-850
I. The kinds of military leaders
845
II. How far an agreement made by military leaders is binding on the supreme authority
845
III. How far such an agreement furnishes occasion for an obligation
846
IV. What, if anything, has been done contrary to instructions? Herein distinctions are presented
846-847
V. Whether in such a case the other party will be under obligation
847
VI. What generals or magistrates are able to do with regard to those of lower rank, or on behalf of them
847-848
VII. Generals do not have the power to make peace
848
VIII. Whether generals may make a truce; herein a distinction
848
IX. What security of persons, and what property, can he given by generals
849
X. Such agreements should be interpreted narrowly; and why
850
XI. How a surrender accepted by a general is to be interpreted
850
XII. How to understand the proviso, ‘if the king or the people has approved’
850
XIII. How to understand the promise to surrender a town
850
Chapter XXIII On good faith of private persons in war
851-856
I. Refutation of the opinion, which holds that private persons are not bound by a pledge given to the enemy
851
II. It is shown that private persons are bound even to a pirate and a brigand; and to what extent
851
III. No exception is here made for a minor
851-852
IV. Whether an error gives release
852
V. Answer to the objection raised from the point of view of public advantage
852-853
[605] 1VI. The previous statements are applied to a pledge given of return to prison
853
VII. The pledge not to return to a certain place; the pledge not to serve as a soldier
853-854
VIII. The pledge not to run away
854
IX. One who has been captured cannot surrender to another
854
X. Whether private persons should be compelled by their rulers to carry out what they have promised
854
XI. What kind of an interpretation ought to be applied in agreements of this sort
855
XII. In what way we are to interpret the terms life, clothing, and the arrival of aid
855
XIII. Who ought to be said to have returned to the enemy
855
XIV. What are adequate reinforcements in the case of a surrender made conditionally?
855
XV. Whatever pertains to the execution of an agreement does not constitute a condition
856
XVI. Regarding hostages given for such agreements
856
Chapter XXIV On implied good faith
857-859
I. How good faith may be tacitly interposed
857
II. An example, in the case of a person who desires to be received under the protection of a people or a king
857
III. An example, in the case of one who asks or grants a parley
857-858
IV. Nevertheless he who asks or grants a parley is not hindered from promoting his own interests, provided that he does not harm the other party to the conference
858
V. Of mute signs which by custom have some meaning
858-859
VI. On the implied approval of a treaty compact
859
VII. When a punishment is impliedly remitted
859
Chapter XXV Conclusion, with admonitions on behalf of good faith and peace
860-862
I. Admonitions to preserve peace
860-861
II. In war peace should always be kept in view
861
III. And peace should also be accepted even at a loss, especially by Christians
861
IV. The consideration stated is useful to the conquered
861
V. The consideration stated is also useful to the conqueror
862
VI. The consideration stated is useful likewise to those whose fortunes are in doubt
862
VII. Peace, when made, must be kept with the utmost scruple
862
VIII. A prayer, and the end of the work
862
Appendix
863-864
From the life of St. Lous, King of France, by Joinville, Chapter LXXXIX
863
From the life of the same, in connexion with the injuctions of St. Louis the King given to his son
863-864
Commentary of Hugo Grotius on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon
[865]-875
[612] The printer to the reader
[866]
Notes on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon
867-875
List of Editions and Translations of the De Jure Belli ac Pacis