I. The order of treatment in the discussion which follows

II. The first rule: In war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible. This is explained

III. The second rule : A right is to be viewed as arising not only from the origin of the war but also from causes which subsequently develop

IV. The third rule: Some things, which are not permissible according to the purpose of a war, may follow therefrom without wrong; a precaution is added

V. What is permissible against those who furnish supplies to our enemies is explained through distinctions

VI. Whether it is permissible to use a ruse in war

VII. In a negative action, deceit is not in itself impermissible

VIII. Deceit in a positive action falls under two heads: deceit exhibited in actions not limited in significance, and that exhibited in actions the significance of which is, as it were, fixed by agreement; it is shown that deceit of the former sort is permissible

IX. The difficulty of the inquiry in respect to the second sort of deceit is indicated

X. Not every use of an expression, which is known to be taken in another sense, is unpermissible

XI. The character of falsehood, in so far as it is unpermissible, consists in its conflict with the right of another ; this is explained

XII. The view is maintained that it is permissible to say what is false before infants and insane persons

XIII. It is permissible to say what is false when he to whom the conversation is not addressed is deceived, and when it would be permissible to deceive him if not sharing in it

XIV. It is permissible to say what is false when the conversation is directed to him who wishes to be deceived in this way

XV. It is permissible to say what is false when the speaker makes use of a superior right over one subject to himself

XVI. It is perhaps permissible to say what is false when we are unable in any other way to save the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance

XVII. The authors who have judged that falsehood spoken in the presence of enemies is permissible

XVIII. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to statements containing a promise

XIX. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to oaths

XX. Nevertheless it is more noble, and more becoming to Christian simplicity, to refrain from falsehood even toward an enemy; this view is illustrated by comparisons

XXI. It is not permissible for us to force any one to do what is right for us but not for him

XXII. Nevertheless we may make use of assistance voluntarily offered

I. By natural law no one except an heir is bound by the act of another

II. Nevertheless it has been established by the law of nations that both the possessions and the acts of subjects are liable for the debt of a ruler

[445] III. An example in the seizure of persons

IV. An example in the seizure of goods

V. Seizure is warranted after a right has been denied, and when it may properly be considered as settled that this has been done; wherein it is shown that a judicial decision does not properly give or take away a right

VI. Such seizure does not warrant the taking of human life

VII. The distinction between what there is relating to this matter in municipal law and in the law of nations

I. A public war according to the law of nations is a war between different peoples

II. The distinction between a people, although acting unjustly, and pirates or brigands

III. Sometimes a transformation is effected

IV. It is essential to the nature of a public war that it should have the support of the sovereign power; in what way this is to be understood

V. A declaration of war is also requisite

VI. What element in the declaration of war is in accordance with the law of nature, and what is peculiar to the law of nations, is set forth with distinctions

VII. A declaration of war is sometimes conditional, sometimes absolute

VIII. What elements in declarations of war pertain to municipal law and not to the law of nations

IX. A war declared against any one is at the same time declared against his subjects and allies, in so far as they take his side

X. A war declared against any one is not held to be at the same time declared against his subjects and allies in so far as they are considered by themselves; illustration by examples

XI. The reason why a declaration is required in order to secure certain effects

XII. The effects referred to are not found in other wars

XIII. Whether war may he waged simultaneously with its declaration

XIV. Whether war must be declared against him who has violated the right of embassy

I. The effects of a public war are explained in general terms

II. A distinction is made between the word ‘permissible’ as referring to that which is done with impunity, although not without moral wrong, and to that which is free from moral wrong even if virtue would enjoin not to do it; with examples

III. The effects of a public war in general are concerned with permission that grants impunity

IV. Why such effects have been introduced

V. Testimony regarding these effects

VI. Out of this right arises the right to kill and injure all who are in the territory of the enemy

VII. What is the situation in case foreigners have entered a country before the outbreak of war?

VIII. The right to inflict injury extends to subjects of enemies anywhere, unless the law of the foreign territory prevents it

IX. The right to inflict injury extends even over infants and women

X. The right to inflict injury extends even over captives, and without limitation of time

XI. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who wish to surrender, but whose surrender is not accepted

XII. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who have surrendered unconditionally

[461] XIII. It is incorrect to refer this right to other causes, as retaliation, or obstinacy of defence

XIV. The right to inflict injury extends over hostages also

XV. By the law of nations it is forbidden to kill any one by means of poison

XVI. By the law of nations it is forbidden to poison weapons or waters

XVII. It is not forbidden by the law of nations to pollute waters in another way

XVIII. Whether or not the use of assassins is contrary to the law of nations

XIX. Whether rape is contrary to the law of nations

I. Enemy property may be destroyed and pillaged

II. Even enemy property that is sacred may be destroyed and pillaged; how this is to be understood

III. Enemy property that is consecrated may be destroyed or pillaged; a caution is added

IV. How far deceit is permissible in these matters

I. What the law of nature is regarding the acquisition of things taken in war

II. What the law of nations is; evidences are cited

III. When a thing capable of being moved may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations

IV. When territory may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations

V. Property which does not belong to the enemy is not acquired by war

VI. What of goods found in ships of the enemy?

VII. Things which our enemies have taken from others by war become ours according to the law of nations; this is attested by evidence

VIII. The opinion, which holds that things taken from the enemy become the property of the individuals who capture them, is refuted

IX. By the law of nature both possession and ownership may be acquired through another

X. The distinction between hostile acts as public or private

[477] XI. Territory is acquired for a people, or for him whose war it is

XII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, become the property of the individuals who take them

XIII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, do not become the property of individuals if the municipal law determines otherwise

XIV. Things captured by a public act become the property of the people or of him whose war it is

XV. Nevertheless in such things some right of decision is usually granted to commanders

XVI. Commanders may turn booty over to the public treasury

XVII. Or commanders may divide the booty among the soldiers; in what way such a division may be made

XVIII. Or commanders may permit pillaging

XIX. Or commanders may grant the spoil to others

XX. Or commanders, having divided the booty into portions, may employ now one method of distribution and now another; in what way

XXI. The committing of peculation in the distribution of booty

XXII. Some change may be made with respect to this common right of booty by a legal enactment or by another’s act of will

XXIII. Thus booty may be granted to allies

XXIV. Booty is often granted to subjects; with illustration by means of various examples on land and sea

XXV. The application of what has been said

XXVI. Whether things which have been taken outside the territory of either belligerent may be acquired by the law of war

XXVII. In what way the right of which we have spoken is peculiar to a public war

I. According to the law of nations all persons captured in a war that is public become slaves

II. Also the descendants of persons captured in war become slaves

III. What may be done to prisoners of war with impunity

IV. The property of captives, even if incorporeal, belongs to their master

V. The reason why the law has thus been established

VI. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to flee

VII. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to resist their master

VIII. The law under consideration has not always existed among all nations

IX. The law under consideration does not now exist among Christians; what has been substituted for it

I. By war also civil authority is acquired, sometimes as vested in a king, sometimes as vested in a people; the effects of such acquisition

II. The right of a master may be acquired over a people, which then ceases to be a state

III. Sometimes the two types of authority are mixed

IV. The possessions of a people, even such as are incorporeal, are also acquired; herewith is discussed the question of the written bond of the Thessalians

I. The origin of the word postliminy

II. Where postliminy may occur

III. By postliminy some things return and some things are recovered

IV. The right of postliminy exists in peace and in war. What is to be done if it has not been mentioned in time of peace?

V. When a free man may return by postliminy while war is in progress

VI. What rights a free man returning by postliminy may recover, and what he may not recover

VII. Rights against a free man returning by postliminy also are restored

VIII. Why those who surrender do not have the right of postliminy

IX. When a people may have the right of postliminy

X. What are the provisions of the municipal law in the case of those who return by postliminy

XI. How slaves are recovered by postliminy, even those who have run away; how those who have been ransomed are recovered

XII. Whether subjects may be recovered by postliminy

XIII. Territory is recovered by postliminy

XIV. The distinction that was formerly observed with regard to movable things

XV. What is the current law with regard to movable things?

XVI. What things may he recovered in such a way as not to need postliminy

XVII. Charges introduced by municipal law as affecting those subject to it

XVIII. How postliminy has been observed among those who were not enemies

XIX. When the right of postliminy may be enforced at the present day

I. With what meaning a sense of honour may be said to forbid what the law permits

II. The principle stated is applied to the things which we said were permitted by the law of nations

III. What is done by reason of an unjust war is unjust from the point of view of moral injustice

IV. Who are bound to make restitution, and to what extent

V. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who took them

VI. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who holds them

I. In a lawful war certain acts are devoid of moral justice; a condition which is explained

II. Who may be killed in accordance with moral justice

III. No one may rightly be killed because of his ill-fortune; for example, those who take sides under compulsion

IV. No one may rightly be killed on account of a fault that is intermediate between ill-fortune and deceit; the nature of such a fault is explained

V. Those who are responsible for a war are to be distinguished from those who follow them

VI. With regard to those who are responsible for a war we must distinguish between causes which may be and those which may not be approved

VII. Punishment may often be remitted justly even to enemies who have deserved death

VIII. One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by accident

IX. Children should always be spared; women, unless they have been guilty of an extremely serious offence; and old men

X. Those also should be spared whose occupations are solely religious or concerned with letters

XI. Farmers should be spared

XII. Merchants and like persons should be spared

XIII. Prisoners of war also should be spared

XIV. The surrender of those who wish to yield upon fair terms should be accepted

XV. Those also who have surrendered unconditionally should be spared

XVI. What has been stated is true, provided that no serious crime has preceded; how this is to be understood

XVII. It is right to spare those who are guilty, if their number is very great

XVIII. Hostages should not be put to death unless they have themselves done wrong

XIX. All useless fighting should be avoided

I. What devastation may be lawful, and in what degree

II. Devastation should be refrained from if the area is profitable for us and out of the power of the enemy

III. Devastation should be refrained from if there is good hope for a speedy victory

[533] IV. Devastation should he refrained from if the enemy has means of subsistence from other sources

V. Devastation should be refrained from if the thing itself is of no use in furnishing resources for war

VI. The principle stated is particularly applicable to things that are sacred or connected with things that are sacred

VII. The principle is applicable also to consecrated things

VIII. The advantages which follow from such moderation are pointed out

I. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is to held, up to the amount of their debt

II. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is not to be held as punishment for the crime of another

III. Here we must understand as debt also indebtedness which arises in time of war. Examples

IV. In this matter it is an obligation of humaneness not to make the fullest use of one's right

I. Tο what extent, in accordance with moral justice, it is permissible to take men captive

II. What is permissible against a slave according to the moral power of justice

III. It is not permissible to kill an innocent prisoner

IV. It is not permissible to punish with severity

V. It is not permissible to impose upon slaves tasks that are excessively severe

VI. Under what circumstances the savings of a slave belong to the master, and under what circumstances to the slave

VII. Whether it is permissible for slaves to attempt to escape

VIII. Whether the children of slaves are bound to the master, and to what extent

IX. What is to be done in countries where the enslavement of prisoners of war is not customary

I. To what extent moral justice permits sovereignty to be acquired

II. It is praiseworthy to abstain from the exercise of the right to acquire sovereignty over the vanquished

IV. Or by leaving the sovereign power to those who had held it—

V. Sometimes by the imposition of garrisons—

VI. Or even by tributes and similar burdens

VII. The advantage derived from such moderation is pointed out

VIII. Examples; with a discussion of a change in the form of government among the vanquished

IX. If sovereignty is to be assumed, it is right to leave a part of it to the conquered

X. Or, certainly, some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered

XI. Some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered, especially in the matter of religion

XII. At any rate the conquered should be treated with clemency; and why

I. Moral justice requires that the things which our enemy has taken from another in an unlawful war shall be restored

II. Examples

III. Whether anything may be deducted from that which is restored

IV. Even subject peoples or divisions of peoples are to be restored to those to whom they belonged, if they have been unjustly taken over by the enemy

V. At what time the obligation to make restoration ceases

VI. What is to be done in a doubtful case

I. From those who are at peace nothing should be taken except in case of extreme necessity, and subject to the restoration of its value

II. Examples of self-restraint and precepts

III. What the duty of those at peace is towards belligerents

I. The question whether it is permissible for individuals to do harm to a public enemy is discussed with special regard to the law of nature, the law of nations, and municipal law

II. What in respect to the enemy is permitted by moral justice to those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense

III. What in respect to their own state is lawful for those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense

IV. What the rule of Christian love demands of such persons

V. How a private war may he mingled with a public war

VI. The obligation resting upon a person, who has done harm to the enemy without orders, is set forth with a distinction

I. Good faith is to be kept with enemies of every description

II. Refutation of the view that faith ought not to be kept with pirates and tyrants

III. Answer to the argument drawn from the fact that such persons deserve punishment, and the proof that this is not taken into account when they have been treated with

IV. The fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, if the fear was not felt as a personal fear by him who made the promise

V. Or, if an oath has been given, the fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, although in the case of a brigand such an oath is violated with impunity so far as men are concerned

VI. The same rules are applicable in relation to rebellious subjects

VII. The special difficulty presented by promises made to subjects under the right of eminent domain

VIII. It is shown also that such promises may be confirmed by an oath of the state

IX. Or, promises are binding if a third person, to whom the promise is made, enters into the case

X. How the political character of a state may be changed

XI. Fear does not justify an exception in respect to a war that is formal according to the law of nations

XII. What is to be understood regarding such a fear as the law of nations recognizes

XIII. Faith must be kept even with the faithless

XIV. Faith does not have to be kept if the condition changes; and this takes place if the other does not keep his part of the agreement

XV. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return

XVI. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return, even if this is on another contract

XVII. Faith does not have to be kept in case damage has been done

XVIII. Furthermore, faith does not have to be kept when something is due as a penalty

XIX. How these principles become applicable in war

I. Division of good faith between enemies, according to the order of what follows

II. In a monarchy the right to make peace belongs to the king

III. What if the king is an infant, insane, a captive, or in exile?

IV. In an aristocracy or a democracy the right of making peace belongs to the majority

V. Now the sovereignty, or a part of the sovereignty, or the property of the realm may be validly alienated for the sake of peace

VI. How far the people, or his successors, are bound, by a peace made by a king

VII. In arranging peace the property of subjects can be given up for the sake of the public advantage, but with the obligation of making good the loss

[577] VIII. What in regard to property already lost in war?

IX. No distinction is here made between property acquired under the law of nations and under the municipal law

X. From the point of view of foreigners public advantage is presumed

XI. General rule for the interpretation of peace covenants

XII. In doubtful cases it is believed that the understanding is that things remain as they are; how this ought to be interpreted

XIII. What if an agreement has been made, that all things are to be restored to the condition in which they were before the war?

XIV. In such cases those who previously were free and of their own accord became subject to another are not restored

XV. In case of doubt damages caused by war are considered as remitted

XVI. The principle stated does not apply to what was owed to individuals before the war

XVII. In case of doubt also punishments, which were publicly due before the war, are considered as remitted

XVIII. What of the right of private persons to infiict punishments?

XIX. A right, which was publicly alleged before the war, but was in dispute, is easily understood to be in abeyance

XX. Things captured after the making of peace must be restored

XXI. Some rules bearing upon the agreement to restore things captured in war

XXII. Regarding income

XXIII. On the names of regions

XXIV. Concerning reference to a former treaty; and concerning him through whom the failure to perform has come

XXV. Concerning delay

XXVI. In case of doubt that interpretation should be adopted which is contrary to the interest of the party that made the terms

XXVII. Distinctions are drawn between furnishing a new cause for war and breaking a treaty

XXVIII. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what is contained in every peace

XXIX. What if allies have made an attack?

XXX. What if subjects have so acted? How their action should be considered as approved

XXXI. What if subjects should engage in warfare under the command of others?

XXXII. What if harm has been done to subjects? Herein a distinction is made

XXXIII. What if harm has been done to allies? Herein likewise a distinction is made

XXXIV. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what has been stated in the peace terms

XXXV. Whether a discrimination ought to be made between the articles of the treaty of peace

XXXVI. What if a penalty has been added?

XXXVII. What if necessity has hindered fulfilment?

XXXVIII. Peace continues, if the one injured so desires

XXXIX. How peace may be broken by acting contrary to what belongs to the special nature of every peace

XL. What falls under the term friendship?

XLI. Whether it is contrary to friendship to receive subjects and exiles

XLII. How war may be ended by drawing lots

XLIII. How war may be ended by a set combat; and whether this is lawful

XLIV. Whether the act of kings in such cases binds their peoples

XLV. In such combats who is to be judged the victor?

XLVI. How war may be ended by arbitration; and here arbitration is understood to be without appeal

XLVII. In case of doubt it is understood that arbitrators are bound to decide according to law

XLVIII. Arbitrators ought not to decide concerning possession

XLIX. What is the force of surrender pure and simple?

L. What is the duty of the victor toward those who make an unconditional surrender?

LI. Concerning conditional surrender

LII. Who can, and should, be given as hostages?

LIII. What the right over hostages is

LIV. Whether a hostage may lawfully escape

LV. Whether a hostage may be lawfully detained for any other reason

LVI. A hostage is set free at the death of the one for whom he came as hostage

LVII. Whether a hostage may be retained after the death of the king who gave him

LVIII. Sometimes hostages are under obligation as principals, and one is not bound for the act of the other

LIX. Of what sort is the obligation arising from pledges of property?

LX. When the right of redemption is lost

I. What a truce is, and whether this interval is to be considered as peace or war

II. The derivation of the word

III. A new declaration of war after a truce is not necessary

IV. How the period of time fixed for a truce ought to be reckoned

V. When a truce begins to be binding

VI. What is lawful during a truce

VII. Whether during a truce it is lawful to retreat and repair walls, and the like

VIII. A distinction regarding the seizure of places in time of truce

IX. Whether, at the end of the truce, one can return who has been detained by force majeure

X. Of special agreements in truces and the questions wont to arise therefrom

XI. When the terms of a truce have been violated by the one side, the other may begin war

XII. What if a penalty, in case of violation of the truce, has been added?

XIII. When the acts of private citizens break the truce

XIV. What interpretation ought to be put on the right of safe-conduct outside of the period of truce

XV. Who may be classed under the term combatants

XVI. How, in this connexion, we are to understand the terms go, come, and depart

XVII. On the extension of this to persons

[597] XVIII. On the extension of safe-conduct to baggage

XIX. Who are included under the terms attendants and nationality

XX. Whether a right of safe-conduct is annulled by the death of the grantor

XXI. What if a right of safe-conduct has been granted subject to the pleasure of the grantor?

XXII. Whether security outside of the territory also is due

XXIII. The favour of ransoming captives

XXIV. Whether ransom may be forbidden by law is explained with the help of a distinction

XXV. Can the right to a captive be transferred?

XXVI. A ransom can be owed to several by one person

XXVII. Whether an agreement can be annulled on the ground that the wealth of the captive was unknown

XXVIII. What goods of the captive belong to the captor

XXIX. Whether the heir owes the price of ransom is explained, with the help of a distinction

XXX. Whether a person, who has been released in order to free another, ought to return if the other has died

I. The kinds of military leaders

II. How far an agreement made by military leaders is binding on the supreme authority

III. How far such an agreement furnishes occasion for an obligation

IV. What, if anything, has been done contrary to instructions? Herein distinctions are presented

V. Whether in such a case the other party will be under obligation

VI. What generals or magistrates are able to do with regard to those of lower rank, or on behalf of them

VII. Generals do not have the power to make peace

VIII. Whether generals may make a truce; herein a distinction

IX. What security of persons, and what property, can he given by generals

X. Such agreements should be interpreted narrowly; and why

XI. How a surrender accepted by a general is to be interpreted

XII. How to understand the proviso, ‘if the king or the people has approved’

XIII. How to understand the promise to surrender a town

I. Refutation of the opinion, which holds that private persons are not bound by a pledge given to the enemy

II. It is shown that private persons are bound even to a pirate and a brigand; and to what extent

III. No exception is here made for a minor

IV. Whether an error gives release

V. Answer to the objection raised from the point of view of public advantage

[605] 1VI. The previous statements are applied to a pledge given of return to prison

VII. The pledge not to return to a certain place; the pledge not to serve as a soldier

VIII. The pledge not to run away

IX. One who has been captured cannot surrender to another

X. Whether private persons should be compelled by their rulers to carry out what they have promised

XI. What kind of an interpretation ought to be applied in agreements of this sort

XII. In what way we are to interpret the terms life, clothing, and the arrival of aid

XIII. Who ought to be said to have returned to the enemy

XIV. What are adequate reinforcements in the case of a surrender made conditionally?

XV. Whatever pertains to the execution of an agreement does not constitute a condition

XVI. Regarding hostages given for such agreements

I. How good faith may be tacitly interposed

II. An example, in the case of a person who desires to be received under the protection of a people or a king

III. An example, in the case of one who asks or grants a parley

IV. Nevertheless he who asks or grants a parley is not hindered from promoting his own interests, provided that he does not harm the other party to the conference

V. Of mute signs which by custom have some meaning

VI. On the implied approval of a treaty compact

VII. When a punishment is impliedly remitted

I. Admonitions to preserve peace

II. In war peace should always be kept in view

III. And peace should also be accepted even at a loss, especially by Christians

IV. The consideration stated is useful to the conquered

V. The consideration stated is also useful to the conqueror

VI. The consideration stated is useful likewise to those whose fortunes are in doubt

VII. Peace, when made, must be kept with the utmost scruple

VIII. A prayer, and the end of the work

From the life of St. Lous, King of France, by Joinville, Chapter LXXXIX

From the life of the same, in connexion with the injuctions of St. Louis the King given to his son

[612] The printer to the reader

Notes on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon

Editions

Translations

Note

Index of authors cited

Subject index

I. The order of treatment in the discussion which follows

II. The first rule: In war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible. This is explained

III. The second rule : A right is to be viewed as arising not only from the origin of the war but also from causes which subsequently develop

IV. The third rule: Some things, which are not permissible according to the purpose of a war, may follow therefrom without wrong; a precaution is added

V. What is permissible against those who furnish supplies to our enemies is explained through distinctions

VI. Whether it is permissible to use a ruse in war

VII. In a negative action, deceit is not in itself impermissible

VIII. Deceit in a positive action falls under two heads: deceit exhibited in actions not limited in significance, and that exhibited in actions the significance of which is, as it were, fixed by agreement; it is shown that deceit of the former sort is permissible

IX. The difficulty of the inquiry in respect to the second sort of deceit is indicated

X. Not every use of an expression, which is known to be taken in another sense, is unpermissible

XI. The character of falsehood, in so far as it is unpermissible, consists in its conflict with the right of another ; this is explained

XII. The view is maintained that it is permissible to say what is false before infants and insane persons

XIII. It is permissible to say what is false when he to whom the conversation is not addressed is deceived, and when it would be permissible to deceive him if not sharing in it

XIV. It is permissible to say what is false when the conversation is directed to him who wishes to be deceived in this way

XV. It is permissible to say what is false when the speaker makes use of a superior right over one subject to himself

XVI. It is perhaps permissible to say what is false when we are unable in any other way to save the life of an innocent person, or something else of equal importance

XVII. The authors who have judged that falsehood spoken in the presence of enemies is permissible

XVIII. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to statements containing a promise

XIX. The use of falsehood is not to be extended to oaths

XX. Nevertheless it is more noble, and more becoming to Christian simplicity, to refrain from falsehood even toward an enemy; this view is illustrated by comparisons

XXI. It is not permissible for us to force any one to do what is right for us but not for him

XXII. Nevertheless we may make use of assistance voluntarily offered

I. By natural law no one except an heir is bound by the act of another

II. Nevertheless it has been established by the law of nations that both the possessions and the acts of subjects are liable for the debt of a ruler

[445] III. An example in the seizure of persons

IV. An example in the seizure of goods

V. Seizure is warranted after a right has been denied, and when it may properly be considered as settled that this has been done; wherein it is shown that a judicial decision does not properly give or take away a right

VI. Such seizure does not warrant the taking of human life

VII. The distinction between what there is relating to this matter in municipal law and in the law of nations

I. A public war according to the law of nations is a war between different peoples

II. The distinction between a people, although acting unjustly, and pirates or brigands

III. Sometimes a transformation is effected

IV. It is essential to the nature of a public war that it should have the support of the sovereign power; in what way this is to be understood

V. A declaration of war is also requisite

VI. What element in the declaration of war is in accordance with the law of nature, and what is peculiar to the law of nations, is set forth with distinctions

VII. A declaration of war is sometimes conditional, sometimes absolute

VIII. What elements in declarations of war pertain to municipal law and not to the law of nations

IX. A war declared against any one is at the same time declared against his subjects and allies, in so far as they take his side

X. A war declared against any one is not held to be at the same time declared against his subjects and allies in so far as they are considered by themselves; illustration by examples

XI. The reason why a declaration is required in order to secure certain effects

XII. The effects referred to are not found in other wars

XIII. Whether war may he waged simultaneously with its declaration

XIV. Whether war must be declared against him who has violated the right of embassy

I. The effects of a public war are explained in general terms

II. A distinction is made between the word ‘permissible’ as referring to that which is done with impunity, although not without moral wrong, and to that which is free from moral wrong even if virtue would enjoin not to do it; with examples

III. The effects of a public war in general are concerned with permission that grants impunity

IV. Why such effects have been introduced

V. Testimony regarding these effects

VI. Out of this right arises the right to kill and injure all who are in the territory of the enemy

VII. What is the situation in case foreigners have entered a country before the outbreak of war?

VIII. The right to inflict injury extends to subjects of enemies anywhere, unless the law of the foreign territory prevents it

IX. The right to inflict injury extends even over infants and women

X. The right to inflict injury extends even over captives, and without limitation of time

XI. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who wish to surrender, but whose surrender is not accepted

XII. The right to inflict injury extends even over those who have surrendered unconditionally

[461] XIII. It is incorrect to refer this right to other causes, as retaliation, or obstinacy of defence

XIV. The right to inflict injury extends over hostages also

XV. By the law of nations it is forbidden to kill any one by means of poison

XVI. By the law of nations it is forbidden to poison weapons or waters

XVII. It is not forbidden by the law of nations to pollute waters in another way

XVIII. Whether or not the use of assassins is contrary to the law of nations

XIX. Whether rape is contrary to the law of nations

I. Enemy property may be destroyed and pillaged

II. Even enemy property that is sacred may be destroyed and pillaged; how this is to be understood

III. Enemy property that is consecrated may be destroyed or pillaged; a caution is added

IV. How far deceit is permissible in these matters

I. What the law of nature is regarding the acquisition of things taken in war

II. What the law of nations is; evidences are cited

III. When a thing capable of being moved may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations

IV. When territory may be held to have been captured, according to the law of nations

V. Property which does not belong to the enemy is not acquired by war

VI. What of goods found in ships of the enemy?

VII. Things which our enemies have taken from others by war become ours according to the law of nations; this is attested by evidence

VIII. The opinion, which holds that things taken from the enemy become the property of the individuals who capture them, is refuted

IX. By the law of nature both possession and ownership may be acquired through another

X. The distinction between hostile acts as public or private

[477] XI. Territory is acquired for a people, or for him whose war it is

XII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, become the property of the individuals who take them

XIII. Movables, or things capable of motion, when captured by a private act, do not become the property of individuals if the municipal law determines otherwise

XIV. Things captured by a public act become the property of the people or of him whose war it is

XV. Nevertheless in such things some right of decision is usually granted to commanders

XVI. Commanders may turn booty over to the public treasury

XVII. Or commanders may divide the booty among the soldiers; in what way such a division may be made

XVIII. Or commanders may permit pillaging

XIX. Or commanders may grant the spoil to others

XX. Or commanders, having divided the booty into portions, may employ now one method of distribution and now another; in what way

XXI. The committing of peculation in the distribution of booty

XXII. Some change may be made with respect to this common right of booty by a legal enactment or by another’s act of will

XXIII. Thus booty may be granted to allies

XXIV. Booty is often granted to subjects; with illustration by means of various examples on land and sea

XXV. The application of what has been said

XXVI. Whether things which have been taken outside the territory of either belligerent may be acquired by the law of war

XXVII. In what way the right of which we have spoken is peculiar to a public war

I. According to the law of nations all persons captured in a war that is public become slaves

II. Also the descendants of persons captured in war become slaves

III. What may be done to prisoners of war with impunity

IV. The property of captives, even if incorporeal, belongs to their master

V. The reason why the law has thus been established

VI. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to flee

VII. Whether it is permissible for those who have been captured to resist their master

VIII. The law under consideration has not always existed among all nations

IX. The law under consideration does not now exist among Christians; what has been substituted for it

I. By war also civil authority is acquired, sometimes as vested in a king, sometimes as vested in a people; the effects of such acquisition

II. The right of a master may be acquired over a people, which then ceases to be a state

III. Sometimes the two types of authority are mixed

IV. The possessions of a people, even such as are incorporeal, are also acquired; herewith is discussed the question of the written bond of the Thessalians

I. The origin of the word postliminy

II. Where postliminy may occur

III. By postliminy some things return and some things are recovered

IV. The right of postliminy exists in peace and in war. What is to be done if it has not been mentioned in time of peace?

V. When a free man may return by postliminy while war is in progress

VI. What rights a free man returning by postliminy may recover, and what he may not recover

VII. Rights against a free man returning by postliminy also are restored

VIII. Why those who surrender do not have the right of postliminy

IX. When a people may have the right of postliminy

X. What are the provisions of the municipal law in the case of those who return by postliminy

XI. How slaves are recovered by postliminy, even those who have run away; how those who have been ransomed are recovered

XII. Whether subjects may be recovered by postliminy

XIII. Territory is recovered by postliminy

XIV. The distinction that was formerly observed with regard to movable things

XV. What is the current law with regard to movable things?

XVI. What things may he recovered in such a way as not to need postliminy

XVII. Charges introduced by municipal law as affecting those subject to it

XVIII. How postliminy has been observed among those who were not enemies

XIX. When the right of postliminy may be enforced at the present day

I. With what meaning a sense of honour may be said to forbid what the law permits

II. The principle stated is applied to the things which we said were permitted by the law of nations

III. What is done by reason of an unjust war is unjust from the point of view of moral injustice

IV. Who are bound to make restitution, and to what extent

V. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who took them

VI. Whether things taken in an unjust war are to be restored by him who holds them

I. In a lawful war certain acts are devoid of moral justice; a condition which is explained

II. Who may be killed in accordance with moral justice

III. No one may rightly be killed because of his ill-fortune; for example, those who take sides under compulsion

IV. No one may rightly be killed on account of a fault that is intermediate between ill-fortune and deceit; the nature of such a fault is explained

V. Those who are responsible for a war are to be distinguished from those who follow them

VI. With regard to those who are responsible for a war we must distinguish between causes which may be and those which may not be approved

VII. Punishment may often be remitted justly even to enemies who have deserved death

VIII. One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by accident

IX. Children should always be spared; women, unless they have been guilty of an extremely serious offence; and old men

X. Those also should be spared whose occupations are solely religious or concerned with letters

XI. Farmers should be spared

XII. Merchants and like persons should be spared

XIII. Prisoners of war also should be spared

XIV. The surrender of those who wish to yield upon fair terms should be accepted

XV. Those also who have surrendered unconditionally should be spared

XVI. What has been stated is true, provided that no serious crime has preceded; how this is to be understood

XVII. It is right to spare those who are guilty, if their number is very great

XVIII. Hostages should not be put to death unless they have themselves done wrong

XIX. All useless fighting should be avoided

I. What devastation may be lawful, and in what degree

II. Devastation should be refrained from if the area is profitable for us and out of the power of the enemy

III. Devastation should be refrained from if there is good hope for a speedy victory

[533] IV. Devastation should he refrained from if the enemy has means of subsistence from other sources

V. Devastation should be refrained from if the thing itself is of no use in furnishing resources for war

VI. The principle stated is particularly applicable to things that are sacred or connected with things that are sacred

VII. The principle is applicable also to consecrated things

VIII. The advantages which follow from such moderation are pointed out

I. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is to held, up to the amount of their debt

II. The property of enemy subjects which has been captured in war is not to be held as punishment for the crime of another

III. Here we must understand as debt also indebtedness which arises in time of war. Examples

IV. In this matter it is an obligation of humaneness not to make the fullest use of one's right

I. Tο what extent, in accordance with moral justice, it is permissible to take men captive

II. What is permissible against a slave according to the moral power of justice

III. It is not permissible to kill an innocent prisoner

IV. It is not permissible to punish with severity

V. It is not permissible to impose upon slaves tasks that are excessively severe

VI. Under what circumstances the savings of a slave belong to the master, and under what circumstances to the slave

VII. Whether it is permissible for slaves to attempt to escape

VIII. Whether the children of slaves are bound to the master, and to what extent

IX. What is to be done in countries where the enslavement of prisoners of war is not customary

I. To what extent moral justice permits sovereignty to be acquired

II. It is praiseworthy to abstain from the exercise of the right to acquire sovereignty over the vanquished

IV. Or by leaving the sovereign power to those who had held it—

V. Sometimes by the imposition of garrisons—

VI. Or even by tributes and similar burdens

VII. The advantage derived from such moderation is pointed out

VIII. Examples; with a discussion of a change in the form of government among the vanquished

IX. If sovereignty is to be assumed, it is right to leave a part of it to the conquered

X. Or, certainly, some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered

XI. Some degree of liberty should be left to the conquered, especially in the matter of religion

XII. At any rate the conquered should be treated with clemency; and why

I. Moral justice requires that the things which our enemy has taken from another in an unlawful war shall be restored

II. Examples

III. Whether anything may be deducted from that which is restored

IV. Even subject peoples or divisions of peoples are to be restored to those to whom they belonged, if they have been unjustly taken over by the enemy

V. At what time the obligation to make restoration ceases

VI. What is to be done in a doubtful case

I. From those who are at peace nothing should be taken except in case of extreme necessity, and subject to the restoration of its value

II. Examples of self-restraint and precepts

III. What the duty of those at peace is towards belligerents

I. The question whether it is permissible for individuals to do harm to a public enemy is discussed with special regard to the law of nature, the law of nations, and municipal law

II. What in respect to the enemy is permitted by moral justice to those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense

III. What in respect to their own state is lawful for those who are serving in the army, or fitting out ships, at their own expense

IV. What the rule of Christian love demands of such persons

V. How a private war may he mingled with a public war

VI. The obligation resting upon a person, who has done harm to the enemy without orders, is set forth with a distinction

I. Good faith is to be kept with enemies of every description

II. Refutation of the view that faith ought not to be kept with pirates and tyrants

III. Answer to the argument drawn from the fact that such persons deserve punishment, and the proof that this is not taken into account when they have been treated with

IV. The fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, if the fear was not felt as a personal fear by him who made the promise

V. Or, if an oath has been given, the fact that a promise has been extorted through fear presents no obstacle, although in the case of a brigand such an oath is violated with impunity so far as men are concerned

VI. The same rules are applicable in relation to rebellious subjects

VII. The special difficulty presented by promises made to subjects under the right of eminent domain

VIII. It is shown also that such promises may be confirmed by an oath of the state

IX. Or, promises are binding if a third person, to whom the promise is made, enters into the case

X. How the political character of a state may be changed

XI. Fear does not justify an exception in respect to a war that is formal according to the law of nations

XII. What is to be understood regarding such a fear as the law of nations recognizes

XIII. Faith must be kept even with the faithless

XIV. Faith does not have to be kept if the condition changes; and this takes place if the other does not keep his part of the agreement

XV. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return

XVI. Faith does not have to be kept in case a just compensation is tendered in return, even if this is on another contract

XVII. Faith does not have to be kept in case damage has been done

XVIII. Furthermore, faith does not have to be kept when something is due as a penalty

XIX. How these principles become applicable in war

I. Division of good faith between enemies, according to the order of what follows

II. In a monarchy the right to make peace belongs to the king

III. What if the king is an infant, insane, a captive, or in exile?

IV. In an aristocracy or a democracy the right of making peace belongs to the majority

V. Now the sovereignty, or a part of the sovereignty, or the property of the realm may be validly alienated for the sake of peace

VI. How far the people, or his successors, are bound, by a peace made by a king

VII. In arranging peace the property of subjects can be given up for the sake of the public advantage, but with the obligation of making good the loss

[577] VIII. What in regard to property already lost in war?

IX. No distinction is here made between property acquired under the law of nations and under the municipal law

X. From the point of view of foreigners public advantage is presumed

XI. General rule for the interpretation of peace covenants

XII. In doubtful cases it is believed that the understanding is that things remain as they are; how this ought to be interpreted

XIII. What if an agreement has been made, that all things are to be restored to the condition in which they were before the war?

XIV. In such cases those who previously were free and of their own accord became subject to another are not restored

XV. In case of doubt damages caused by war are considered as remitted

XVI. The principle stated does not apply to what was owed to individuals before the war

XVII. In case of doubt also punishments, which were publicly due before the war, are considered as remitted

XVIII. What of the right of private persons to infiict punishments?

XIX. A right, which was publicly alleged before the war, but was in dispute, is easily understood to be in abeyance

XX. Things captured after the making of peace must be restored

XXI. Some rules bearing upon the agreement to restore things captured in war

XXII. Regarding income

XXIII. On the names of regions

XXIV. Concerning reference to a former treaty; and concerning him through whom the failure to perform has come

XXV. Concerning delay

XXVI. In case of doubt that interpretation should be adopted which is contrary to the interest of the party that made the terms

XXVII. Distinctions are drawn between furnishing a new cause for war and breaking a treaty

XXVIII. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what is contained in every peace

XXIX. What if allies have made an attack?

XXX. What if subjects have so acted? How their action should be considered as approved

XXXI. What if subjects should engage in warfare under the command of others?

XXXII. What if harm has been done to subjects? Herein a distinction is made

XXXIII. What if harm has been done to allies? Herein likewise a distinction is made

XXXIV. How a treaty of peace may be broken by acting contrary to what has been stated in the peace terms

XXXV. Whether a discrimination ought to be made between the articles of the treaty of peace

XXXVI. What if a penalty has been added?

XXXVII. What if necessity has hindered fulfilment?

XXXVIII. Peace continues, if the one injured so desires

XXXIX. How peace may be broken by acting contrary to what belongs to the special nature of every peace

XL. What falls under the term friendship?

XLI. Whether it is contrary to friendship to receive subjects and exiles

XLII. How war may be ended by drawing lots

XLIII. How war may be ended by a set combat; and whether this is lawful

XLIV. Whether the act of kings in such cases binds their peoples

XLV. In such combats who is to be judged the victor?

XLVI. How war may be ended by arbitration; and here arbitration is understood to be without appeal

XLVII. In case of doubt it is understood that arbitrators are bound to decide according to law

XLVIII. Arbitrators ought not to decide concerning possession

XLIX. What is the force of surrender pure and simple?

L. What is the duty of the victor toward those who make an unconditional surrender?

LI. Concerning conditional surrender

LII. Who can, and should, be given as hostages?

LIII. What the right over hostages is

LIV. Whether a hostage may lawfully escape

LV. Whether a hostage may be lawfully detained for any other reason

LVI. A hostage is set free at the death of the one for whom he came as hostage

LVII. Whether a hostage may be retained after the death of the king who gave him

LVIII. Sometimes hostages are under obligation as principals, and one is not bound for the act of the other

LIX. Of what sort is the obligation arising from pledges of property?

LX. When the right of redemption is lost

I. What a truce is, and whether this interval is to be considered as peace or war

II. The derivation of the word

III. A new declaration of war after a truce is not necessary

IV. How the period of time fixed for a truce ought to be reckoned

V. When a truce begins to be binding

VI. What is lawful during a truce

VII. Whether during a truce it is lawful to retreat and repair walls, and the like

VIII. A distinction regarding the seizure of places in time of truce

IX. Whether, at the end of the truce, one can return who has been detained by force majeure

X. Of special agreements in truces and the questions wont to arise therefrom

XI. When the terms of a truce have been violated by the one side, the other may begin war

XII. What if a penalty, in case of violation of the truce, has been added?

XIII. When the acts of private citizens break the truce

XIV. What interpretation ought to be put on the right of safe-conduct outside of the period of truce

XV. Who may be classed under the term combatants

XVI. How, in this connexion, we are to understand the terms go, come, and depart

XVII. On the extension of this to persons

[597] XVIII. On the extension of safe-conduct to baggage

XIX. Who are included under the terms attendants and nationality

XX. Whether a right of safe-conduct is annulled by the death of the grantor

XXI. What if a right of safe-conduct has been granted subject to the pleasure of the grantor?

XXII. Whether security outside of the territory also is due

XXIII. The favour of ransoming captives

XXIV. Whether ransom may be forbidden by law is explained with the help of a distinction

XXV. Can the right to a captive be transferred?

XXVI. A ransom can be owed to several by one person

XXVII. Whether an agreement can be annulled on the ground that the wealth of the captive was unknown

XXVIII. What goods of the captive belong to the captor

XXIX. Whether the heir owes the price of ransom is explained, with the help of a distinction

XXX. Whether a person, who has been released in order to free another, ought to return if the other has died

I. The kinds of military leaders

II. How far an agreement made by military leaders is binding on the supreme authority

III. How far such an agreement furnishes occasion for an obligation

IV. What, if anything, has been done contrary to instructions? Herein distinctions are presented

V. Whether in such a case the other party will be under obligation

VI. What generals or magistrates are able to do with regard to those of lower rank, or on behalf of them

VII. Generals do not have the power to make peace

VIII. Whether generals may make a truce; herein a distinction

IX. What security of persons, and what property, can he given by generals

X. Such agreements should be interpreted narrowly; and why

XI. How a surrender accepted by a general is to be interpreted

XII. How to understand the proviso, ‘if the king or the people has approved’

XIII. How to understand the promise to surrender a town

I. Refutation of the opinion, which holds that private persons are not bound by a pledge given to the enemy

II. It is shown that private persons are bound even to a pirate and a brigand; and to what extent

III. No exception is here made for a minor

IV. Whether an error gives release

V. Answer to the objection raised from the point of view of public advantage

[605] 1VI. The previous statements are applied to a pledge given of return to prison

VII. The pledge not to return to a certain place; the pledge not to serve as a soldier

VIII. The pledge not to run away

IX. One who has been captured cannot surrender to another

X. Whether private persons should be compelled by their rulers to carry out what they have promised

XI. What kind of an interpretation ought to be applied in agreements of this sort

XII. In what way we are to interpret the terms life, clothing, and the arrival of aid

XIII. Who ought to be said to have returned to the enemy

XIV. What are adequate reinforcements in the case of a surrender made conditionally?

XV. Whatever pertains to the execution of an agreement does not constitute a condition

XVI. Regarding hostages given for such agreements

I. How good faith may be tacitly interposed

II. An example, in the case of a person who desires to be received under the protection of a people or a king

III. An example, in the case of one who asks or grants a parley

IV. Nevertheless he who asks or grants a parley is not hindered from promoting his own interests, provided that he does not harm the other party to the conference

V. Of mute signs which by custom have some meaning

VI. On the implied approval of a treaty compact

VII. When a punishment is impliedly remitted

I. Admonitions to preserve peace

II. In war peace should always be kept in view

III. And peace should also be accepted even at a loss, especially by Christians

IV. The consideration stated is useful to the conquered

V. The consideration stated is also useful to the conqueror

VI. The consideration stated is useful likewise to those whose fortunes are in doubt

VII. Peace, when made, must be kept with the utmost scruple

VIII. A prayer, and the end of the work

From the life of St. Lous, King of France, by Joinville, Chapter LXXXIX

From the life of the same, in connexion with the injuctions of St. Louis the King given to his son

[612] The printer to the reader

Notes on the epistle of Paul the apostole to philemon

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